Texas Southern University

Digital Scholarship @ Texas Southern University
Dissertations (2016-Present)

Dissertations

5-2022

Terrorism: A Case Study of The Global Security Threat of Boko
Haram and The ISIS Alliance in Nigeria
Emmanuel Ben-Edet

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalscholarship.tsu.edu/dissertations
Part of the Defense and Security Studies Commons

Recommended Citation
Ben-Edet, Emmanuel, "Terrorism: A Case Study of The Global Security Threat of Boko Haram and The ISIS
Alliance in Nigeria" (2022). Dissertations (2016-Present). 8.
https://digitalscholarship.tsu.edu/dissertations/8

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Dissertations at Digital Scholarship @ Texas
Southern University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations (2016-Present) by an authorized
administrator of Digital Scholarship @ Texas Southern University. For more information, please contact
haiying.li@tsu.edu.

TERRORISM: A CASE STUDY OF THE GLOBAL SECURITY THREAT OF
BOKO HARAM AND THE ISIS ALLIANCE IN NIGERIA

DISSERTATION
Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
The Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School
of Texas Southern University

BY
Emmanuel Ben-Edet, BSc., M.Sc., MPA, MSW

Texas Southern University

2022

Approved By

Dr. Ihekwoaba Declan Onwudiwe
Chairperson, Dissertation Committee
Dr. Gregory H. Maddox
Dean, The Graduate School

Approved By

Dr. Ihekwoaba Declan Onwudiwe
Chairperson, Dissertation Committee

10/28/21
Date

Dr. Emmanuel Nwagwu
Committee Member

10/28/21
Date

Dr. Robert Mupier
Committee Member

10/28/21
Date

Dr. David Baker
Committee Member

10/28/21
Date

ii

© Copyright by Emmanuel Ben-Edet 2022
All Rights Reserved
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Professor Ihekweaba Declan Onwudiwe, Advisor
The literature on terrorism indicates that religion, cultures of origin, and
environmental factors play globally critical roles in the emergence of terrorist groups
worldwide. Terrorists use violence and threats to strike fear and intimidate people and
governments into pursuing their religious, political, and ideological goals. One of the
deadliest jihadist groups, Boko Haram, emerged in the early 2000s with a jihadist
agenda mainly focused on Nigeria’s Islamization. In 2009, it launched violent attacks in
Nigeria, which is Africa’s largest economy, and currently controls a large swathe of
territory in its northeastern part. In its desire to create a caliphate, Boko Haram swore
allegiance to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Empirical evidence suggests that
the Nigerian government has not been able to ward off its aggression successfully. There
are, however, gaps in the literature regarding the nature and complexity of the Boko
Haram-ISIS alliance in Nigeria. The collateral consequences of such a coalition with its
attendant global security threats are understudied, and this dissertation intends to fill that
gap by expounding on the literature’s strengths and limitations, using the Global
Terrorism Database and qualitative secondary data analysis from 2000–2020. The
research will examine the anomic situation in Nigeria and the instability resulting from
1

2
the breakdown of social norms. This will be done through the application of anomie and
strain theories. Finally, the data findings will guide proactive suggestions for
criminological policies and future research recommendations for the Nigerian
securitization solution.
Keywords: Terrorism, Boko Haram, ISIS, Islam, security, coalition, the Nigerian
military
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Terrorism is a major global security threat, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa;
several militant and terrorist groups have sprung up, turning the continent into a hotbed
of violent terrorist activities. Northeastern Nigeria has experienced extremist terrorist
activities primarily attributed to Boko Haram, which is currently one of the deadliest
jihadist groups. With over 5 million internally displaced persons, kidnap cases, and
deaths, Boko Haram has become the leading terrorist group in Nigeria. Boko Haram’s
alliance with ISIS has given it access to vast resources within the global terrorist
network (Ndinojuo, 2018). In a recent study by the University of Maryland on global
terrorism conducted for the American government, Boko Haram-related deaths exceed
those inflicted by al Qaeda in Iraq, the Maoists in India, and al-Shabab and al Qaeda
Arabian Peninsula (Aghedo & Eke, 2013). Extant literature suggests that the Nigerian
government has not been able to ward off these terrorist aggressions successfully. While
there have been many types of research, articles, and presentations done independently
on Boko Haram and ISIS’s terrorist activities, there is a dearth of knowledge regarding
how much the alliance with ISIS has transformed Boko Haram’s activities in Nigeria.
The collateral consequences of such an alliance with its attendant global security threats
are understudied, and in this dissertation I intend to fill that gap.
The term “terrorism” is perhaps one of the most controversial concepts to elicit
thought-provoking debate. According to Ronczkowski (2018), terrorism indicates that
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the ideology of religion, cultures of origin, and environmental impact play critical roles
in the emergence of terrorist groups in the world today. Terrorism constitutes an extreme
form of aggression. The perpetrators use violence or violent threats to strike fear,
intimidate people, and governments to pursue their religious, political, and ideological
goals. Boko Haram emerged in the early 2000s, and the ferocity of its attacks is some of
the worst ever experienced globally (Thurston, 2018). So, what is terrorism? How do we
handle it, what information should we gather, how do we analyze it, what are we looking
for, and why are criminologists still interested in investigating terrorism (Ronczkowski,
2018)?
Some of the more commonly cited definitions of terrorism come from the U.S.
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the U.S. Department of State (DoS), and the U.S.
Department of Defense (DoD). The FBI defined terrorism as the illegal use of force and
violence against persons or property to terrify or compel a government, the civilian
population, or any sector that furthers political or social objectives. In the same vein, the
DoS defined terrorism as an action directed against persons involving violent acts or acts
dangerous to human life, which would be a criminal violation if committed within the
jurisdiction of the United States and is intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian
population, to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion, or to
affect the conduct of a government by assassination or kidnapping. The DoD stated that
terrorism is the calculated use of violence or threat of violence to inculcate fear, intended
to coerce or intimidate government or societies to pursue goals that are generally
political, religious, or ideological (Ronczkowski, 2018). The African Union (formerly
known as the Organization of African Unity [OAU], 1999, p. 207) defined terrorism as
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any act that violates the criminal laws of a state party that may endanger the life,
physical integrity, or freedom of others or cause severe injury or death to any person or
any number or group of persons or that causes or may cause damage to public or private
property, natural resources, environmental, or cultural heritage. Boko Haram ticks all the
boxes to be termed a terrorist group, gaining an international platform through their
sworn allegiance to ISIS. Terrorism is about the psychology of fear (Phillip Zimbardo
cited in Bongar, 2007, p. 3). Onwudiwe (2001) aptly stated that nothing justifies the fog
of terror that claims innocent lives.
Background and Significance
From 2000–2020, Nigeria witnessed a rapid increase in terrorist activities that
has displaced over 5 million people in northeastern Nigeria. Boko Haram’s attacks
began in 2003, followers of the radical leader Mohammed Yusuf relocated to remote
areas of Yobe State and continuously clashed with local authorities. In 2009, the group
launched an uprising in northeastern Nigeria after fighting with the Maiduguri state’s
security authorities. During this violent clash, which lasted for about 5 days, over 800
people reportedly were killed. Yusuf was captured by the Nigerian military and handed
over to the police; he died while in custody (Mike, 2015).
The Boko Haram terrorist group remained dormant for about a year after the
2009 military assault that resulted in Yusuf’s death. Abubakar Shekau, his deputy, later
emerged as the leader of BH, was believed to have been shot in the leg during that
assault, but he escaped to the neighboring country of Chad or Sudan. Researchers
predicted a return to violence, especially with the underlying issues of deep poverty,
corruption, lack of education, and jobs for the youths. The terrorist group crisis then
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assumed a notorious dimension when the group started suicide bombing attacks by using
the army of frustrated Almajiri to perpetuate the violence. Poverty is a significant factor
fueling the Boko Haram crisis in the northeast. The nexus between poverty and terrorism
is the low socio-economic indicator of the region (Mike, 2015; Olanrewaju, 2019). In
2009, Boko Haram swore allegiance to ISIS. It was bolstered to launch various violent
attacks on military formation, unarmed citizens with the climax on the global platform in
April 2014, when they kidnapped about 300 secondary school girls in Chibok, deep in
Nigeria’s remote northeast (Mike, 2015).
In this case study, I seek to increase global awareness of the violent terrorist
activities in Africa’s most populous nation, Nigeria. Significantly, it will provide the
federal government of Nigeria, researchers, nongovernmental agencies (NGOS), human
rights activist groups, and private and public security agencies with information that will
benefit their overall understanding of the alliance between the two world’s deadliest
terrorist groups. It will also provide information for policymakers with implications for
the Nigerian and global securitization solutions. Expectedly, this case study will draw
further attention to Nigeria’s current state of insecurity, guide a better understanding of
the issues related to terrorism, and expose areas that other researchers need to focus on
in the future.
Research Objectives
The main objective of this case study is to examine the impact of insurgencies
caused by the Boko Haram and ISIS terrorist alliances in Nigeria with the following:


Analyze the ideology of religion, the origin of culture, and the Almajiri
syndrome among northern Nigerian youths, seeing as the terrorist group exploits
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these stress-induced societal issues and preys on the vulnerable as potential
recruits with promises of economic deliverance;


Review the role of poverty in the fight and struggle between Boko Haram and
the Federal government of Nigeria;



Examine poverty as a strain and struggle among the youth who are potential
recruits for the terrorist groups; and



Determine the response of the Nigerian military to terrorist activities in the
northeastern part of the country and assess the role of policymakers in the issue
of terrorism.

Research Purpose Statement
The research purpose of this case study is to analyze terrorist insurgencies in
Nigeria by examining the global security threat of the Boko Haram and ISIS terrorist
alliance in Nigeria and its attendant collateral consequences. This case study focuses on
the years 2000–2020. In it, I review the history of terrorism, contextualize Boko
Haram’s rise within the literature of the group’s specific religious, political, and social
objectives, and examine the global security threat it poses beyond the Nigerian borders. I
also explore Boko Haram’s radicalization process and recruitment strategies that make
prospective recruits accept the extremist ideology. The origin of the ideology is
irrelevant in determining homegrown versus international terrorism; what matters is
where it is embraced (Southers, 2013). This qualitative case research is necessary to
provide some historical analysis of terrorism in Nigeria, the alliance between the world’s
two deadliest jihadist groups, the collateral consequences (e.g., economic hopelessness,
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extreme poverty-Almajiris, loss of faith in the social contract with the State, corrupt
leadership) of this terrorist alliance, and its attendant global security threat.
Research has dealt with these groups independently and without much focus on
their lethal jihadist alliance. In this study, I describe the Nigerian security situation
beyond current governmental strategies, developing its relevance on how this local story
fits into the attendant global security threat with broader meanings and operations. I also
expound on various definitions and review the economic, religious, political, and social
impacts of these conflicts from a criminological (i.e., the why) and criminal justice
perspectives. The intent, with recommendations, is the anticipated policy implications as
countermeasures to check terrorism at its embryonic stage.
Research Problem Statement
Statement of the problem for this case study is the continuous insurgency by the
Boko Haram and ISIS terrorist alliance in Nigeria and the attendant global security
threat with unimaginable collateral consequences. Initial successes by ISIS on their
jihadist exploits in Iraq and Syria are credited as innovative and attractive for these
devastating alliances, especially for gaining inroads into Africa’s most populous state,
Nigeria (Culp, 2019). The vicious killings and loss of properties in northeastern Nigeria
reflect the present darkness and the realities of what life is about: even though the
Nigerian government, in many instances, has proclaimed Boko Haram has been
conquered, contemporary illustrations depict a different reality when reviewing the
country’s terrorist security threat from 2000–2020.
Recently, Nigeria was named the third-most terrorized country in the Global
Terrorism Index (GTI), after Afghanistan and Iraq, where citizens must pay tolls to
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access their farmlands. State and federal legislators have decried this incessant raid and
lack of regard for human lives, with an estimated 5 million deaths recorded so far in the
country’s northeastern region. However, many questions remain unresolved about the
efficacy of the Nigerian government’s strategies in tackling these extreme criminalities,
the economic devastation, and the attendant hardship on the citizenry, even as the nation
experiences a wave of economic recession. Moreover, the Nigerian military has not
shown that they are genuinely prepared to conquer the terrorists taking over most
villages in its northeastern parts. Many have opined that the Nigerian government’s
seemingly ineffective military reactions to these collateral consequences of terrorism
within the country are reminders of an act in the Russian roulette’s dangerous display
with millions of lives and livelihood at stake.
Essentially, I want to contribute to the existing body of knowledge about the
alliance of the two most dreaded terrorist groups globally, Boko Haram and ISIS, by
examining their collaborative consequences and global security threat. I also explore the
ideology of religion, unemployment, the Almajiri syndrome among northern Nigerians,
just as terrorist groups exploit these societal issues, preying on the vulnerable as
potential recruits with promises of deliverance from the social-economic problems.
Definition of Terms
Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI): This is a jihadist group in Iraq founded by Abu Musah
al Zarqawi; it would later become the Islamic State of Iraq and later known as the
Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham, or ISIS. It refers to itself now only as the Islamic
State.
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Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM): This Qaeda affiliate operates in the
Sahara and Sahel regions of North Africa.
Almajiri: A representation of students who leaves their parents for Qur’anic
education.
Ansar Bayt al Maqdis (ABM): A jihadist group that arose following the Arab
Spring in Egypt’s Sinai region. It has declared its territory in Sinai to be a province of
ISIS.
Al Shabab: A group affiliated with al Qaeda with its base in Somali.
Boko Haram: This fundamentalist jihadi group in Nigeria, which took shape in
northeastern Nigeria in the early 2000s, attracted support for its belief that Western-style
education means “Boko,” in Hausa, which is evil and legally forbidden by the Islamic
religion. The forbidden act is an Islamic legal term for Haram, in Hausa and Arabic.
(Thurston, 2017)
Caliph: He is a ruler of the Muslim community and political successor of
Muhammad.
Caliphate: This political-religious state is led by a caliph.
Eid al-Fitr: This is the last day of Ramadan, the Islamic month of fasting and
religious reflection.
Islamic Army of Iraq: A former Iraqi Sunni Arab insurgency group formed
during the 2003 invasion. After the withdrawal of American troops in 2011, the group
demilitarized and formed a political opposition group.
Islamic State (I.S.): This is the name of ISIS after it declared itself a caliphate.
Jihad: This means a struggle or striving in Islam.
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Shariah: Shariah is the Islamic moral code and religious law. There are huge
disagreements among Muslims about how Shariah fits into modern life. ISIS and AQaffiliated groups embrace a harsh interpretation, but there are differences in the details
for these two groups.
Sunnah: This is the recorded tradition of Prophet Muhammad.
Sunni Islam: This is the largest branch of Islam. It is often referred to as
mainstream or orthodox Islam.

CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
Defining Terrorism
As I discussed in Chapter 1, the term “terrorism” has caused much debate, and no
one word defines it or has been singularly adopted by scholars. According to Akanni
(2004), Nigerians have experienced terrorism or terrorist attacks in different forms,
especially in the northeast. As a result, there is now an atmosphere of fear among its
citizens, cutting across religion. Terrorism has become an attractive tactical tool to
quickly attract a target audience’s attention. It is a global phenomenon with a deliberate
and systematic act of violence premeditated to destroy, kill, maim, and frighten the
vulnerable to achieve a cause or draw local and international attention to demands that
ordinarily might be impossible or difficult to accomplish under standard political
negotiation. Akpor-Robaro and Lanre-Babalola (2018) postulated that terrorism becomes
an insurgency when these activities are operated by a group of individuals with a known
or an unknown identity, primarily when the group or individual’s actions are organized
with a high level of sophistication to capture and take control of a target geographical
location with a given population of people that displaces them politically, socially, and
economically, sometimes without any concrete goal. It is an uprising of dissident groups
to protest internally perceived unfavorable policies of the government.
Ronczkowski (2018) stated that three of the more commonly cited definitions of
terrorism come from the FBI, DoS, and DoD, and they were outlined as follows:
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1. The FBI’s definition of terrorism is the unlawful use of force and violence
against a person or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian
population, or any segment in furtherance of political or social objectives.
2. The DoS definition is an activity, directed against persons involving violent
acts or acts dangerous to human life, which would be a criminal violation if
committed within U.S. jurisdiction and is intended to intimidate or coerce a
civilian population, to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or
coercion, or to affect the conduct of a government by assassination or
kidnapping.
3. The DoD definition is a calculated use of violence or threat of violence to
inculcate fear or to coerce or to intimidate government or societies in the
pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological.
4. The African Union defined terrorism as “any act which is a violation of the
criminal laws of a State Party and which may endanger the life, physical
integrity or freedom of, or cause serious injury or death to, any person, any
number or group of persons or causes or may cause damage to public or
private property, natural resources, environmental or cultural heritage” (OAU,
1999:207).
Ronczkowski (2018) also postulated that terrorism often depends on researchers’
position, and mission and on the period they seek to define terrorism. He stated that no
one should get hung up on having an all-inclusive definition of terrorism but instead
focus on understanding what makes up terrorism. The term means planned, politically
motivated violence perpetrated against civilian targets by subnational groups or
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clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience. Ronczkowski also stated
that international terrorism (e.g., the alliance between Boko Haram and ISIS) means
terrorism that involves residents or territories of more than one country. Ronczkowski
highlighted that terrorist activities are designed to make a statement. These activities are
forms of propaganda done by people who know that most media outlets cover sensational
and tragic events. These activities take many forms, including assassinations, bombing,
arson, sabotage, hostage taking, property damage, and anarchy.
Martin (2017) argued that perspective is a central consideration in defining
terrorism. An essential step toward defining terrorism is to understand the sources of
terrorism. To identify those steps, one must understand the role of extremism as a
primary feature of all terrorist behavior. Those who oppose an extremist group’s view or
violent behavior, often the victims or targets of these extremist groups, would naturally
consider them terrorists. Meanwhile, those for whom the group is championing and on
whose behalf the terrorist war is being fought often see them as liberation fighters even
when their methods do not reflect the people they represent. Martin stated that many
radical Islamists view themselves as Mujahidin (holy warriors) or Shaheed (martyrs),
whose motivating ideal is selfless obedience to God’s will rather than Western notions of
freedom. Martin further stated that many scholars will learn that the truism of one
person’s terrorist is another person’s freedom fighter, which plays a significant factor in
the definition debate of terrorism.
According to Stern and Berger (2015), the definition of terrorism is murky in
distinguishing terrorism, insurgency, and war. Stern and Berger defined terrorism as an
act or threat of violence against noncombatants, aiming to exact revenge, intimidate, or
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otherwise influence an audience. In their definition of terrorism, Stern and Berger stated
that terrorists are nonstate actors who engage in violence against noncombatants to
accomplish a political good or amplify a message. Hoffman (2017) believed that the
definition of terrorism in the most accepted contemporary usage of the term is
fundamentally and inherently political. It is also ineluctably about power: the pursuit of
power, the acquisition of power, and violence to achieve political change. Many scholars
have concluded that the word “political” stands out in defining terrorism and the
activities that support terrorist acts.
History Behind the Evolution of Terrorism
It is vital to know the history behind the evolution of terrorism because this
should provide insights into terrorism’s growth and how it became a modern-day
obsession (Ronczkowski, 2018). The term terrorism originated in revolutionary France
in the late 1700s, known as the Reign of Terror, and has its roots in the 18th century’s
Enlightenment Period. The Reign of Terror was the name given to the French citizens’
bloody violence by their revolutionary leader, Maximilien Robespierre. The term
changed by the mid-1800s to describe violent revolutionaries who revolted against
governments. And in the early 1900s, the name was used in the United States to describe
labor organizations and anarchists. According to Ronczkowski, after World War II, the
term was associated with nationalist groups’ revolting against European domination. In
the 1940s–1950s, France and England were the two hardest hit because they had
colonial settlements on various continents, especially Africa.
Also in the 1940s, the State of Israel was formed in the Middle East. The
replacement of the Ottoman by the British as a governing colonial force over
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Palestinians and Jews in Palestine became known as the Balfour Declaration of 1917,
where the Jews were promised a home in Palestine (Ronczkowski, 2018, p. 20). The
British’s unfulfilled promise saw the Jews turn to urban terrorism and established the
Irgun Zvai Leumi (national military organization) to remove the British. The French
suffered greatly from terrorist attacks in Africa against colonialism in Algeria by the
National Liberation Front (NLF), and the Mau targeted the English colonies in Kenya.
These terrorist activities continued until 1948 when Israel was recognized as a nation,
but that did not end the Middle East conflicts for Israel, particularly with the rise of the
Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), which continued to fight against non-Arabs
in the region.
To date, the Middle East conflict has not diminished, giving rise to left-wing
groups that have brought a whole new meaning to terrorism. History also demonstrates
that the Sicarii were tagged as a radical Jewish Zealot terrorist group that fought against
the Roman Empire (66–70 AD) using various methods of attacks, including using
daggers on presumed enemies in broad daylight. Their targets were mainly Greek
residents in Judea, Roman leaders, and even moderate Jews suspected as Roman allies.
Sicarii zealots had one goal of eliminating Roman control, believing that this would
create the way for their Messiah’s coming (Onwudiwe, 2007).
The revelation from history also shows that nationalist movements or
nationalism began a cause for later-day terrorist converts, especially in the 19th and
early 20th centuries. This phase of terrorism was characterized as one in which
nationalists advocated for nationhood for citizens under colonial rule, using every means
possible, including terrorist acts, to achieve their goals (Onwudiwe, 2001). In
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furtherance of his description of terrorism, Onwudiwe alluded to the point that
criminology has not yet fully embraced historical issues like colonialism, imperialism,
and neocolonialism as systems of economic, political, social, and cultural domination (p.
64). These were fundamental issues in criminology’s quest to explain terrorism and
articulate necessary countermeasures against it.
Terrorism, once characterized by changes in the way intellectuals approached
social issues and class-based revolutions like the Russian Revolution, is sure of one
thing: the meaning and style employed by terrorist groups or terrorism have changed
with society over time (Ronczkowski, 2018). Today, terrorism is associated with groups
like Hezbollah, al Qaeda, Boko Haram, al Shabab, the Islamic State in Iraq, Levant
(ISIL), and the Islamic State (I.S.). The last two are commonly known as ISIS by the
media and much of the general population. And these groups can independently operate
from any state with members who are violent religious extremists (Ronczkowski, 2018).
The public might be blindsided by the collateral consequences of a terrorist alliance
between the deadly jihadist group of Boko Haram in Nigeria and ISIS, which acts as the
global platform needed to project their goal of making the largest economy in Africa a
Caliphate. Table 1 highlights the 10 countries most affected by terrorism in the world
today, with Nigeria third on the list after the countries in the Middle East, which is
indicative of how close the country is at the brink of collapsing (See Table 2 for
Nigeria’s landmark events between 1914-1999).
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Table 1
Ten Countries Most Affected by Terrorism (2015)

Table 2
Nigeria’s Landmark Events Between 1914-1999
Dates

Landmark Events

1914

Amalgamation by the British colonialist represented by Governor-General Lord
Fredrick John Dealtry Lugard (1858–1945)
Spouse: Flora Shaw, Lady Lugard (1902–1925)

1960

Independence from British Government (Union Flag lowered and the Green, White,
Green Flag raised)

1967

Nigerian/Biafran civil war

1970

No victor, no vanquished (rehabilitation, reconstruction, and reintegration—3Rs).

1999

Democratically elected government following years of military rule
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The Federal Republic of Nigeria is a sovereign country in West Africa sharing
borders with Niger in the north, Chad in the northeast, Cameroon in the east, and the
Benin Republic in the West. Nigeria became an independent federation on October 1,
1960. Nigeria experienced a civil war (1967–1970) that almost devastated the young
nation. In the aftermath, the country witnessed a sequence of military and democratically
elected leaders.
The country attained a stable democracy in 1999. In the 2015 presidential
election, the nation, for the first time, witnessed an incumbent President (Goodluck
Jonathan) lose re-election to the current president, Muhammadu Buhari. Nigeria is a
complex multinational state inhabited by over 250 ethnic groups speaking about 500
distinct languages, all identified by diverse cultures. The three largest ethnic groups in
Nigeria are the Hausa–Fulani in the north (predominantly Muslim), Yoruba in the West
(Muslims and Christians), and Igbo in the east (primarily Christian), together comprising
over 60% of the total population.
According to Varella (2020), Nigeria is the country with the highest population
in Africa. Its population of over 200 million people in 2019 is projected to increase
regularly in the next decades, with real GDP per capita amounting to US$1,950.90, and
ranks as the 166th economy globally. Varella also stated that by 2050, this number could
double to about 400 million people. In the last 50 years, Nigeria’s population has grown
at an extremely high rate. One main feature that characterizes Nigeria’s demographics is
the young age; in 2018, the population’s median age equaled 18.4 years, meaning about
half of its people is younger than19. Lagos, the largest city in Nigeria, has over 14
million residents, and it is also the largest city in all Sub-Saharan Africa. Abuja,
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Nigeria’s capital, counted about a half-million inhabitants in 2020, ranking 15th among
Nigeria‘s largest cities.
According to Osaghae and Suberu (2005), Nigeria presents a complexity of
individuals, a crisscrossing and recursive identities of ethnic, religious, regional, and
subethnic (communal) most salient and the main bases for violent conflicts in the
country. Regional cleavages and identities developed from the structures created and
consolidated by the colonialists in state formation in Nigeria. The most fundamental of
the divisions is that the ethnic and intricate religious complexities within the three
central regions (see Figure 1), the initial structures that colonialists administered
separately, became worse after the units were amalgamated in 1914.
Figure 1
Nigeria’s Political Contention

Source: Religius and Ethnic map of Nigeria.png. (2020, October 15). Wikimedia Commons, the free media repository.
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Campbell (2013) argued that Nigeria, with its large population and natural
resource endowment, is the most important strategic partner to the United States.
However, widespread alienation and fragmentation have contributed to Nigeria’s
becoming one of the most religious and, at the same time, violent countries in the world.
Campbell found that with the Boko Haram-related terrorist incidents, officially
sanctioned violence is shocking in its magnitude and reflects the Nigerian government
institutions’ weaknesses.
There is no set time frame for when Boko Haram started. One of the reports
stressed that the group began in 1995 under the leadership of one Malam Abubakar
Lawan and then changed names several times from Ahlul Sunnah Wal Jama’ah Hijra to
the Nigerian Taliban Yusufiyyah sect to Boko Haram. Early attacks by the sect started in
2003 in Kanama and Geidam Yobe State in northeastern Nigeria. Boko Haram is
considered a political uprising, a religious group, a social movement, or a purely
criminal affair (Sule et al., 2018).
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Table 3
Boko Haram Historical Timelines

YEAR
1999/2000

2003

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013
2014
2015

KEY EVENTS
The push for Sharia laws by northern politicians under President Olusegun
Obasanjo began, and 12 northern states later adopted some form of Sharia
criminal laws.
Boko Haram began taking shape when followers of the group’s radical leader
Yusuf clashed with constituted authorities and retreated into remote areas in
Yobe.
Under Yusuf’s leadership, Boko Haram launched an uprising in Nigeria’s
northeastern part clashing with Maiduguri security agencies. Within the 5 days
that these violent clashes lasted, over 800 people were killed. Yusuf was later
captured by security forces and shot dead while in police custody.
After more than a year in hiding, Boko Haram re-emerged with a series of
coordinated assassinations and a prison raid under the leadership of Yusuf’s
deputy, Shekau.
Boko Haram claimed responsibility for the suicide car bomb attack on the
United Nations Headquarters in the Nigerian capital city of Abuja that killed 23
people.
Boko Haram’s new leader, Shekau, claimed responsibility for a series of
coordinated assaults and bomb attacks that killed over 185 people in Kano,
Nigeria’s second-largest city.
President Goodluck declared a security emergency in three northeastern states
after Boko Haram seized territory in remote areas of the region.
Boko Haram attacked the northeastern town of Chibok and kidnapped 276 girls
from their dormitories; this terrorist act led to global outrage.
January 2015
This attack was one of the worst ever Boko Haram attacks
on the town of Baga in northeastern Nigeria that left
perhaps up to 2,000 people dead.
January 31, 2015
Regional offensive targeting Boko Haram takes shape,
and the Chadian military aircraft bomb the Nigerian town
of Gamboru, held by Boko Haram.
March 7, 2015
Boko Haram pledged allegiance to ISIS.
March 28, 2015
Nigeria held Presidential elections won by exmilitary
ruler Major General Buhari (Rtd.)
May 2015
The Nigerian military claimed to have freed over 700
people held as hostages. These included women and
children, but it was unclear if the hostages included those
kidnapped from Chibok.
May 29, 2015
President Buhari was sworn in as Nigeria’s new president.

Source: Boko Haram: Inside Nigeria’s Unholy War. Source: Smith, Mike (2015). I. B.
Tauris.
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In 1999, during the era of President Olusegun Obasanjo, 12 northern State
politicians led by Zamfara State Governor Ahmad Sani Yerima pushed for establishing
Sharia law as the main body for civil and criminal laws. These laws, however, were
viewed by many to be selectively enforced (Smith, 2015). From 2000–2003 and
evolving from an initial theater of actions in parts of northern Nigeria (especially in
Yobe, Adamawa, Kano, and Borno States), Boko Haram began to take shape when
followers of the radical cleric Yusuf retreated into a remote area of Yobe state and had
several clashes with the authorities. The Boko Haram insurgency subsequently extended
to other countries in the Chad Basin: Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and the rest of Nigeria.
This has created a shared sense of crisis among these West African states. Moreover,
while this insurgency in Nigeria currently receives less attention than other terrorist
activities internationally, it attained global notoriety between 2007 and 2015 (Orock,
2019; Smith, 2015).
Historically, Boko Haram’s exact origin remains essentially contested, but there
are suggestions that the sect’s emergence may have drawn inspiration from the
Maitatsine riots of the 1980s. Boko Haram had no specific name at formation, and its
members attracted several descriptions where they operated based on the local
population’s perception. Founded in Maiduguri in 2002 by Yusuf, the group was
initially established as a religious complex (a school and mosque), but it had other
concealed objectives. It later became fertile grounds for these Islamic fundamentalists to
breed their jihadist followers (Amao, 2020). The name Boko Haram is drawn from a
combination of the Hausa word “Boko,” which means book, and the Arabic word
“haram,” which means something forbidden, ungodly, or sinful. It literally means the
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“book is immoral,” but its deeper meaning is that Western education is blasphemous,
sacrilegious, or ungodly and should be forbidden (Adesoji, 2011).
The Boko Haram uprising in Nigeria in July of 2009 under Yusuf’s leadership
was the beginning of a landmark phase built on recurring religious violence in the
Nigerian State. According to Campbell (2013), Yusuf’s group started as small and
marginal parts of the more significant Islamic protest movement in the country’s
northeast, and the members were usually nonviolent. Campbell also postulated that
Boko Haram’s transformation from a small, peaceful group into a violent campaign was
encouraged and caused by the Nigerian security service’s brutality. Boko Haram then
was not the first set of religious groups that tried to impose their religious ideology on
the Nigerian secular state. The fanaticism of the sect’s soldiers helped widen the scope
of Islamic revivalism in Nigeria. This uprising resulted in the death of around 800
people within 5 days, and in that encounter, Yusuf was captured and shot dead by the
Nigerian police (Adesoji, 2010; Mike, 2015). Following his killing, the shift toward
violence took root. The new leader, Shekau, offered civilians a stark choice to embrace
their Islam brand or face violence (Thurston, 2017).
Aghedo and James (2013) claimed that the Nigerian State has relied heavily on
repressive instrumentalities in managing the Boko Haram violence, including arrest,
detention, proscription of the group, declaration of emergency rule in parts of the north,
and killing of the sect’s members. Some perceptive observers and analysts of the region
argued for conciliatory measures, including poverty alleviation, mass literacy promotion,
dialogue, and amnesty with pay. Pérouse de Montclos (2014) argued that the Boko
Haram group’s movement remains mysterious, with little evidence to substantiate
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different allegations about its real agenda. In the wake of the April 2014 kidnapping of
the 300 Chibok schoolgirls in Borno state, much international media attention has been
drawn to the movement. Boko Haram has been portrayed as anti-women, anti-Christian,
anti-education, and terrorist.
According to Smith (2015), the kidnapping of nearly 300 girls from their school
in northeast Nigeria was an atrocity that would draw global attention to an insurgency
that had by then left a trail of destruction and carnage so horrifying that people
questioned if Nigeria were spiraling toward another civil war. Smith opined that to
understand what led to a rampaging band of young men engaging in suicide bombings,
kidnapping, and wholesale slaughter, one must look beyond Boko Haram’s formation
and review that complex history of Nigeria. Smith also stated that Islam in West Africa
and the deep corruption embedded in most African countries had robbed the continent’s
biggest oil producer, largest economy, and the most populous nation of even the
essential development, keeping most of its citizens agonizingly poor.
The peculiarity of Boko Haram in Nigeria is not its criminality but the sectarian
nature of its agenda. This is quite distinct from the dynamics of resource-driven
localized violent conflicts between different ethnic groups in Plateau state or the ethnic
claims of insurgent groups such as the O’odua People’s Congress (OPC), the Movement
for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), and the Movement for the
Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB). The Nigerian government
also initiated various attempted negotiations with the following timelines to engage the
Boko Haram group without much success:

24
In September 2011, former president Obasanjo held talks in Maiduguri with
Boko Haram members, in which Shehu Sani, a senator from the northeast and human
rights activist, was also involved. Boko Haram’s ceasefire conditions included an end to
arrests and killings, reimbursement for the families of members killed by security forces,
and trial of the police officers responsible for Yusuf’s death (Pérouse de Montclos,
2014).
In March 2012, Boko Haram pulled out of indirect talks with the government.
Also, Dr. Ibrahim Datti Ahmed, president of the National Supreme Council on Sharia,
withdrew as a facilitator, attributing this to a lack of sincerity on the government’s part.
In media reports of June 2012, another round of talks mediated by Islamic scholar
Sheikh Dahiru Usman Bauchi halted due to sabotage by government elements and cold
feet on Boko Haram’s part.
In August 2012, there were reports of secret negotiations in Saudi Arabia, led by
Vice-President Namadi Sambo. Boko Haram spokesman Abu Muhammed claimed these
were with a fake Boko Haram faction.
November 2012, some alleged Boko Haram members set out five provisions for
an end of hostilities, including naming the mediators for dialogues: Alhaji Shettima Ali
Mongunu, Senator Bukar Abba Ibrahim, General Buhari (Rtd.), Ambassador Gaji
Galtimari, and Barrister Aisha Wakil (and her husband). In President Goodluck’s
regime, the special adviser on media and publicity, Reuben Abati, applauded the offer as
a positive development.
By April 2013, the president set up a 26-member committee headed by Special
Duties Minister Kabiru Tanimu Turaki to explore the prospect of permitting an official

25
pardon to Boko Haram members. The committee’s report recommended forming an
advisory committee to take the dialogue forward with amenable members. However,
Shekau, in July 2013, refuted the claims by Minister Kabiru Turaki that a ceasefire
agreement had been reached.
In May 2014, the government considered but rejected the possibility of
negotiating with Boko Haram to return the 276 kidnapped Chibok schoolgirls (see
Figure 2) in exchange for Boko Haram detainees’ release. On February 19, 2018,
another 110 schoolgirls were kidnapped by Boko Haram from Government Girls
Science and Technical College (CGSTC) in Dapchi, located in Yobe State, in northeast
Nigeria, about 170 miles from Chibok. Only 104 of these girls were later rescued by the
Nigerian military in March 2018.
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Figure 2
Key Terrorist Groups in Africa

Source: ABC News. (2019). African Terrorist Groups - Infographic. ABC News.
In December 2020, over 300 Nigerian schoolboys were kidnapped from their
school in Katsina state, and Boko Haram claimed responsibility. It was an ugly and
embarrassing reminder of the events of the Chibok and Dapchi schoolgirls’ kidnapping.
This time, the Nigerian government responded in a timely manner, securing all the
schoolboys’ release. At the end of 2020, after the inglorious event that propelled the
Boko Haram terrorist group on to the global stage with thousands of people dead, about
112 of the Chibok girls are still in captivity. Also, still captive is a Dapchi schoolgirl,
Leah Sharibu, who refused to renounce her Christian faith and has reportedly been made
a slave for life by Boko Haram.
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Figure 2 depicts regions within the African continent where different terrorist
groups have taken control and are establishing a caliphate. In Nigeria, where Boko
Haram operates, they have boosted their ranks by drawing potential recruits from the
Almajiris (young boys taught Islamic ideology and doctrines as a way of life).
The Almajiri
The Almajiris have become an enormous challenge to the Nigerian government,
especially their telling effect on the overall socioeconomic development of the
northeastern part of the country. They are also a haven for potential recruits into the
dreaded Boko Haram terrorist group. According to the UN Convention on Child Rights,
a child is considered anyone below 18 (The Convention on the Rights of the Child: The
children’s version, UNICEF) . In 1989, the convention set out various declarations that
would improve children’s quality of life worldwide. Some of the rights set out at the
declaration include the right to education, health care, love and care, adequate food, and
shelter. According to Taiwo (2013), the word “Almajiri” is from Sheik Abba Aji, a
renowned Maiduguri-based Islamic scholar; it is a word borrowed from the Arabic
language derived from the word “Al-Muhajir,” meaning a searcher of Islamic
knowledge. Its foundation was the migration of the Prophet Mohammed from Mecca to
Medina, and the emigrants known as Al-Muhajiroun migrated with the prophet. These
emigrants had no means of livelihood in Medina; however, based on the prophet’s
fraternity, they were coselected into disparate trades and vocations as apprentices who
were paid for their services by their hosts.
On almost every street corner (especially in the northern part of Nigeria) are
young, homeless, poor, neglected, and maltreated children roaming the streets begging
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for food and alms. These young children are called the Almajiri, a representation of
students who leaves their parent for Qur’anic education. Almajiri is also derived from
the Arabic word “Almuhajirun” regarding migrants. It refers to a traditional method of
acquiring and memorizing the Qur’an in Hausa/Fulani land, where their parents or
guardians send out boys at their tender ages to other villages, towns, or cities for Qur’an
education under a knowledgeable Islamic scholar called a Malam (Yusha’u et al., 2013).
The practice of Almajiri is one of the primary forms of child abuse in northern Nigeria
(Zakir, 2014).
According to Aghedo and Eke (2013), Boko Haram proliferation and escalation
are better understood as collateral consequences of a youth bulge syndrome, especially
the availability of cheap foot soldiers among the Almajirai. These itinerant Quranic
pupils, they argued, constitute not only the most significant number of out-of-school
children in the country but also a tremendous task to the realization of both national and
international conventions and protocols related to children, including education for all
objectives and the millennium development aims. They also pose a direct threat to
national security. The Almajiri phenomenon in northern Nigeria showcases the
debauched and overwhelming African youth crisis; it mainly reflects dysfunctional
systemic structures.
Taiwo (2013) cited a recent report that said there were more than 10 million
Almajiris on the streets of northern Nigeria. Without formal education, they have a grim
future. The Nigerian government and people of the north have let this condition
continue, probably due to what they derived from it. In their belief system, the education
of many is the liberation of all, creating competition and making them lose their exalted
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positions; thus, these children are neglected and subjected to all sorts of ill treatment.
This attempt to protect their autocratic, feudal lifestyle and the struggle to preserve their
political class has led to this modern-day monster. The negative impact of the Almajiri
system of education, simply put, is child labor. Almajiri must assist their mallams in
earning what he and his family eat. Therefore, they must make a living by begging to
feed themselves and contribute to the mallams’ welfare. The Almajiri became a perfect
excuse for some parents to reduce the burden of rearing children. The Almajiri
phenomenon has provided the grounds for the recruitment of masses of Muslim children
into various antisocial activities; many are turned into beggars, hawkers, and wanderers.
It was and still is a source that the Boko Haram group often used as pools for recruits
(Yusha’u, et al., 2013). Aghedo and Eke (2013) rightly argued that the Boko Haram
Islamic fundamentalist sect draws many foot soldiers from the Almajiri demographic
cohort. Figure 3 below reflects the Nigeria poverty graph, with unemployment at 6.1%
in 2019.
Figure 3
Nigerian Poverty Graph Source: (Statista, 2021)
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Rise of ISIS
ISIS adopted brutal tactics from the beginning of its war. The international
community was surprised in early 2014 when a little-known Sunni insurgent group
overran significant swaths of territory in northern Iraq, seizing major cities like Mosul
and Tikrit. This unknown Sunni group morphed into ISIS to establish a caliphate. ISIS
successfully inspired international fighters to join their movement, with many volunteers
from Africa, Europe, and the United States. One of the group’s main goals was to have
these volunteers return to their countries and carry out jihads domestically. As with al
Qaeda before it, ISIS inspired other insurgent groups to profess allegiance to the ISIS
cause of creating a pan-Islamic state. Boko Haram in northeastern Nigeria and the
bordering region declared their allegiance in 2015 with a political agenda of establishing
an Islamic state (Martin, 2017, 2018).
According to Culp (2019), ISIS’s origin and construction were rooted in the
ideological approach initially championed by the late Abu Musab al Zarqawi (Tawhid
wal Jihad) in Iraq in the early 2000s, who trained many of the radicals who took up arms
in the Iraq insurgency during the American intervention. Culp also affirmed that because
ISIS declared their caliphate in June 2014, there has been an incomparable number of
terrorist attacks directed in the West by individuals (lone wolves) or groups like Boko
Haram, inspired either by jihadist ideology or sworn allegiance to ISIS. ISIS has since
mounted a joint operation to expand its presence and control beyond Syria and Iraq. ISIS
has proclaimed the formation of wilayats (provinces) in Afghanistan/Pakistan, Algeria,
the Caucasus region of Russia, Egypt, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and West Africa
while carrying out attacks in several other surrounding countries (Gartenstein-Ross et
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al., 2016). According to Gartenstein-Ross et al., ISIS has used its propaganda
machinery, one of the group’s most effective tools, to facilitate its growth into new
areas. In almost every country where the group has established a presence, the group has
deployed a robust messaging campaign (establishing a caliphate) to win over potential
allies, including regional jihadist groups, political Islamists, and local Sunnis
intimidating adversaries.
Ogbogu (2015) argued that from ISIS’s perspective, accepting Boko Haram as an
ideological proxy gives it a foothold in a region where the prevailing social, political,
and economic conditions are conducive for religious radicalization and recruitment. The
Almajiris and many unemployed youths in northeastern Nigeria provide a rich reservoir
for potential recruits. Gartenstein-Ross (2018) concluded that the ability of terrorist
groups to learn from one another and how other terrorist organizations adopt one
group’s modus operandi is not researched enough within academia. Therefore, we must
investigate and comprehend how ISIS has potentially influenced the prospect of global
Islamic terrorism in the years to come. While there is current and relevant research about
the political, security, and economic repercussions of international terrorism and the
evolution of ISIS, there is a gap in the literature regarding how ISIS has potentially
shaped the Islamic transnational threat, the possible implications, and the future of
terrorism. Moreover, most studies on terrorism focused on the current state of terrorism,
whereas studies that address the future of terrorism are al Qaida focused. According to
Parida (2007), terrorism remains an ongoing and severe threat to human rights, regional
and international (global) peace, and security.
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Table 4
Global Terrorist Groups

The Alliance
Currently, there is much literature on terrorism, Boko Haram, and ISIS.
However, there is still a vast literary gap on the alliance between the two deadliest
jihadist groups. Its attendant global security threat and collateral consequences may
quickly turn Nigeria, Africa’s most populous nation, into a caliphate. Here, I plan to
contribute to and develop on the work regarding terrorist groups and African security,
with a focus on Nigeria. Although studies on African security-related issues have
examined acts perpetrated by terrorist groups like al Shabab, Boko Haram, ISIL Libya,
and the Lord’s Resistance Army (see Table 4), there has not been extensive qualitative
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research on the Boko Haram, ISIL alliance, and the resultant global threat. This study
also provides insight into the three-pronged political, religious (lack of collaboration
between Muslim and Christian leaders), and military response to the insurgency.
In recent years, Nigeria, has experienced multiple violent acts of terrorism. Many
scholars have argued that with the Nigerian experience, poverty, massive youth
unemployment, endemic corrupt leadership, the ideology of religion, cultures of origin,
environmental impacts, and underdevelopment are among the many issues plaguing the
northeastern part of the county. Ndinojuo (2018) argued that northern Nigeria’s society’s
structure was perhaps instrumental in Maitatsine and Yusuf’s success in garnering
followers. One core attribute of this society was the popularity of a state-sponsored
Islamic education, which generated an Almajiri institution that made young people
itinerant and homeless students of the Koran and Arabic studies. In the north, this
created a mass of eager youths who could be easily swayed and manipulated to do the
bidding of perceived religious scholars and authorities. Ndinojuo also found that Islamic
fundamentalists took advantage of the existing historical disdain of the northern society
for Western education, riding on unemployed youths’ emotions as a cesspool for violent
rebellion against constituted authority.
This brutal nature is displayed in communal conflicts that Boko Haram engages
in with massive collateral damage. Much of the highly brutal and heavy casualty
communal clashes triggered by Boko Haram have been concentrated around Nigeria’s
northeastern areas, specifically in Adamawa, Borno, Maiduguri, and Yobe States. The
Boko Haram’s and ISIL’s combat readiness and complexity give them the courage to
attack host communities destroying food and cash crops. This alliance emboldens the
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group, giving them the ability to confront and even attack constituted authorities
protected with state-of-the-art military convoys (Nte, 2016, p. 27).
Depending on the dictum or cliché in vogue about who is or is not a terrorist,
these Boko Haram groups’ actions may be called terrorism, revolutionary, or freedom
fighting. According to Onwudiwe (2007), scholars and social thinkers have been
awakened to focus on the issue of terrorism, especially after 9/11 because terrorism can
no longer escape criminological inquiry. Orehek and Vazeou-Nieuwenhuis (2014)
claimed that the incidence of terrorism continues to rise with technological advances that
facilitate the attraction, attention, and emotional impact terrorists seek. Therefore, it is
appropriate to note that the Nigerian government faces a significant challenge as they are
expected to respond responsibly to these acts of terrorism. Nigerian policymakers must
understand that the historical facts about terrorism are essential if there is any hope of
countering the modern, brutal nature of terrorism (Onwudiwe et al., 2016).
In his contribution to the issues related to terrorism in Nigeria, Thurston (2018)
argued that for anyone to understand Boko Haram, key aspects of Nigerian politics are
relevant: cutthroat elections, pervasive corruption, severe inequality, violence, and
impunity that surrounds approaches to conflict management. Thurston also highlighted
that Boko Haram calls itself Jama’a Ahl as-Sunna Li-da’wa wa-al-Jihad, which means
people devoted to promulgating the Prophet’s doctrines and Jihad. The term Boko
Haram means Western education is forbidden in the Hausa language. It denotes the
movement’s abhorrence to what it perceives as foreign and un-Islamic influences in the
region.
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Amao (2020) stated that from 2009–2018 (a decade in which Boko Haram grew
in territorial leaps and bounds), the factors responsible for this resurgence could be
viewed along two main strands: (a) the emergence, growth, and unchecked influence of
the I.S. backed-Islamic State West Africa Province (ISAWP) as a splinter sect within the
Boko Haram camp and (b) the gross underfunding and ill-equipped State of the Nigerian
military. Amao also stated that it was a period where Boko Haram launched its first
major violent attack on Nigeria, ostensibly to entrench an ideology that stands opposed
to the acquisition of Western education and to seek the establishment of an Islamic
caliphate in West Africa. Although opinions have remained divided on the conflict’s
fundamental cause and the most appropriate response to the insurgency, the jury is
unanimous on the Nigerian State’s casualty figure and its stigma. The ISIS-backed Boko
Haram terrorist activities focused mainly on Nigeria’s northeast have resulted in the loss
of at least 37,500 lives and properties. It has left more than 7.1 million people to rely on
humanitarian assistance, and 2.4 million people displaced (with 80% of them located in
Borno state), creating an estimated 232,000 Nigerian refugees from May 2011 to May
2019 (Amao, 2020).
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Figure 4
Number of Deaths by Terrorism

Adesoji (2010) argued that the Boko Haram uprising in July 2009, aided by the
support from ISIS, marked another phase in the recurring pattern that violent uprising,
riots, and disturbances have become in Nigeria. Adesoji added that given the
heterogeneous nature of Nigerian society, the religious sensitivity of Nigerians, and the
prolonged military rule that ended with the advent of civilian administration in 1999—
during which a significant section of the society was highly militarized—the situation
could perhaps not have been different. Adesoji found alarming the Islamic
fundamentalist’s forceful attempt to impose a religious ideology on a constitutionally
recognized secular society in Nigeria. Adesoji also reaffirmed that the Boko Haram
uprising was not the first violent attempt to impose a religious ideology on a secular
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Nigerian society. The Maitatsine rebellion 1980–85 was the first. These attempts have
successfully widened the scope of Islamic revivalism in the country. Recent events
indicate that despite the vicious suppression of previous attempts, the resistance
mounted by the Boko Haram group, the spread and swiftness of its military
organization, the belief of its leadership, and its membership all show an extraordinary
commitment to the cause. Many believe that the present Boko Haram group could
successfully engage a modern state in a military duel. Yet the Boko Haram uprising
attracted attention because the legitimacy of a state was challenged while promoting
Islamic revivalism and because its outbreak was an indictment of the Nigerian State and
its leaders. This seeming ineptitude became apparent with regular bouts of violence of
many kinds despite the state’s continuous promises to check and secure its citizens’
lives.
This ideology of religion is the middle ground for the alliance between these two
terrorist groups. According to Ogbogu (2015), from the ISIS perspective, accepting
Boko Haram as an ideological proxy gives it a foothold in a region where the prevailing
social, political, and economic conditions are conducive for religious radicalization and
recruitment. Ogbogu argued that the links between the two terrorist groups evolved from
the acknowledgment and emulation of ISIS by Boko Haram to what is seen as the
beginning of cooperation between both groups. He also stated that, videos released by
Boko Haram show that it has upped its ante and has given its media outlet a dramatic
facelift, featuring better graphics and better production quality, much like the videos
produced by the ISIS media wing. Ogbogu further argued that for Boko Haram, falling
under the ISIS banner could broaden its appeal and aid its recruitment. The high
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unemployment rates, illiteracy, and absence of basic amenities, especially in northern
Nigeria, have made the area a fertile ground for Boko Haram recruitment.
The Nigerian Military
The military approach has increasingly been proven ineffective to end terrorism in
the area, and the Nigerian military response to Boko Haram’s terrorist activities is no
different. The several factors driving radicalization can be categorized into three
analytical frames: push, pull, and personal characteristics (Onapajo & Ozden, 2020).
Push factors explain the structural defects in a society that turns individuals into violent
extremism. Otherwise known as the root causes, their examples include bad governance,
poverty and unemployment, vast socio-economic inequality, illiteracy, political exclusion
and marginalization, and state repression. Understanding these factors is a necessary step
in the deradicalization process. Deradicalization principally targets the extreme version of
radicalism, given that it aims to change the violence-prone beliefs of an individual even
when they have not physically engaged in the acts of violence (Onapajo & Ozden, 2020).
Several studies have reviewed the military operations vis-à-vis the governments’ claims
of Boko Haram’s defeat (Onuoha et al., 2020). However, empirical evidence shows
soldiers’ mutiny, desertion from war fronts, and low morale resulting in the Boko Haram
insurgency’s high success rate. Thus, despite the rise in the security sector budget from
about US$1.44 billion in 2009 to US$2.81 billion in 2018, military-led counterinsurgency
operation in Nigeria still faces notable and significant security challenges (Onuoha et al.,
2020).
According to Joshua et al. (2021), Nigeria gained its independence in 1960 and
became a republican state in 1963 when the Queen of England ceased to be Nigeria’s
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head. The First Republic lasted from 1963–1966 when the military took over political
power in a coup d’état. In July 1967, Nigeria experienced a civil war that lasted till
January 1970. Nigeria’s civil war was one of Africa’s first. The degree of bloodshed and
its impact on civilians shocked the world (Falola et al., 2018). The 182-Armed Forces &
Society 47(1) Second Republic started from 1979 to 1983 when the military handed over
political control to a democratically elected government for the second time in 1979. The
Third Republic halted (1991–1993) when the military took over the government’s regime
in 1993 and later promised to hand over political power to a democratically elected
government in an inconclusive transition. This impasse left the military holding onto
power following alleged insecurities in its ranks. The Fourth Republic commenced on
May 29, 1999, and continued to date, when the military leaders at the helm of affairs
handed over political power to another democratically elected government. Joshua et al.
(2021) also observed that insecurity had become a significant challenge in Nigeria. The
efforts made at curbing insecurity further escalates rather than diminishes it, making its
investigation compelling. Therefore, the military’s involvement in internal security has
worsened the problem of insecurity due to its unprofessional approach and often its
deliberate targeting of the civilian populace, which it should protect.
According to De Montclos (2020), since 2009, Nigeria has not defeated the Boko
Haram group despite the formation in 2015 of an antiterrorist coalition with Cameroon,
Niger, and Chad, called the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF). Instead, it has
decided to withdraw into so-called super-camps, which, in practice, have left the terrorist
group free to roam outside urban areas. From this perspective, the fighting against Boko
Haram instead evokes the rather classic asymmetric warfare case. De Montclos argued
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that there are no frontlines, and the rebels hold the countryside in northeastern Nigeria.
Simultaneously, government forces are entrenched in towns and go out only with large
convoys of armored vehicles. The government security forces tried to ward off ambushes
by firing first into crowds in cities and then into the bush. It began mounting operations
in rural areas after the proclamation of emergency rule in June 2013. In Nigeria, President
Buhari’s government, for example, claimed that the military defeated the real Boko
Haram group technically in 2015. Since then, some officials have argued that Boko
Haram combatants’ resilience should be explained by the change in a jihadist nebula that
no longer seeks to control territory but destabilizes the region on behalf of the Islamic
State Daesh.
Mac Ginty & Richmond (2013) claimed that nonmilitary approaches are
increasingly being advocated as an alternative or additional strategy to successfully
address the growing problem of terrorism and insurgency. It is convincingly argued that
nonmilitary processes, including political negotiations, deradicalization, disengagement,
amnesty, and reintegration programs, are better able to tackle the primary causes of
terrorism and produce sustainable peace. The global security threat of the alliance
between Boko Haram and the ISIS terrorist group in Nigeria is my focus in this
dissertation. My intention is to show that this alliance between the two most violent
terrorist groups has created an anomie in Nigeria with dire consequences tearing apart
one of the leading oil-producing nations in Africa. These issues that may have given rise
to violence and instability have exposed security lapses within the Nigerian security
agencies and the government’s gross inability to effectively respond to the collateral
consequences of the alliance between the two jihadist groups.
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The Nigeria Military Funding
Figure 5 shows that Nigeria’s expenditure on military remained stable at around
0.5% of the country’s GDP, with the highest spending in 2011 (0.58%) and the lowest
occurred in 2014 (0.41%) of the gross domestic product. Countries globally spend on
average 2.2% of their GDP on defense.
Figure 5
Nigeria Military Expenditure Between 2008 and 2019

The United States and China have spent the most on their military (Statista,
2021). My objective in this case study is not to compare the different nation’s military
expenditure but to statistically determine and prove with empirical data Nigeria’s
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military’s funding in response to the Boko Haram and ISIS-backed terrorist activities in
Nigeria.
Overview of Theoretical Perspectives
Theory of Anomie
Anomie is a state of normlessness where society fails to effectively regulate its
members’ expectations or behaviors (Durkheim, 1965).
Several criminological theories can explain the ongoing terrorist attacks on
various Nigerian communities by Boko Haram in alliance with ISIS. However, the
theoretical framework that guides this dissertation is synonymous with economic
inequalities and anomie’s social norms or rules breakdown. According to Williams and
McShane (2014), anomie, which belongs to positivist theory, is strongly associated with
two theorists, Emile Durkheim (1858–1917) and Robert K. Merton (1910–2003).
Durkheim, viewed as one of the founders of criminology, introduced the term “labor
division in society” in 1893. Williams and McShane claimed that Durkheim focused on
society. Its organizational development is a reaction to the classical school of thought
that humans were free and rational in a contractual society. Durkheim argued that
inequality was a natural and inevitable human condition associated with social problems,
such as crime, except when there are broken social norms or rules. Durkheim called such
breakdowns anomie to reveal that these changes occurred in his society due to
industrialization (Bernard et al., 2016).
Williams and McShane (2014) referred to anomie as the breakdown of social
norms and conditions in which those norms no longer control societal members’
activity. They saw it as a term describe a state of deregulation within a society. In this
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situation, rules define how people should behave toward each other’s breakdowns,
creating an environment of normlessness where people no longer know what to expect.
And when society becomes deregulated, it often leads to deviant societal behavior that
creates an atmosphere of chaos. Williams and McShane claimed that Merton’s
theoretical perspective on anomie theory was a theory of deviance where one conceives
a society that emphasizes well-structured goals for its citizens and places strenuously
structured avenues to reach those goals.
Agbiboa (2013) argued that Boko Haram’s ideology is deeply embedded in
traditional Islamism and is one of several variants of radical Islamism to have emerged
in northern Nigeria. The group mounted a full-fledged insurgency following
confrontations with the state’s security agency in Bauchi State charged to enforce a
newly introduced law that required motorcyclists in the entire country to wear crash
helmets. Members of Boko Haram refused to obey this law. Agbiboa claimed that with
Boko Haram’s large-scale attacks that have spread serious ripples beyond Nigeria’s
shores, backed by their alliance with ISIS, there is no doubt that their terrorist activities
have generated a psychological impact that transcends the actual physical damage
caused.
According to Bernard et al. (2016), anomie theory can be used as the basis for
explaining crime and varieties of deviant behaviors. Walsh (2000) argued that anomie
conditions serve as releasers of criminal behavior, occurring at a lower threshold for
some individuals than others. Durkheim rightly pointed this out when he stated that there
could not be a society where individuals do not deviate to some extent from the
collective type; some will inevitably assume a criminal character (p. 1,086). Bernard et
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al. (2016) also claimed that in one of Durkheim’s writings (“Suicide,” 1951), Durkheim
was unambiguous when he stated that it was man’s insatiable appetite for resources
(e.g., wealth, status, prestige) that underlies crime and criminality. The moral norms of
any society function to hold this egoistic pursuit of self-interest in check through its
laws.
According to Bernburg (2002), anomie theory has always been considered a
conceptual tool often used in understanding the relationship between societal structures,
cultures, and deviant behaviors. Bernburg argued that shared cultural values (e.g., the
present-day experience with Boko Haram and the ISIS alliance) define and sanction
people’s goals. Bernburg further stated that individuals feel enormous pressure to attain
their aspirations and at the same time are confronted with weak normative restraints on
legitimate means to accomplish these set goals through what he termed “institutionalized
anomic theory.” Merton’s theory of anomie is still considered one of the most dominant
criminological theories, even though it dates to 1938. Merton posited that the social
inequality that prevents those in the lower echelon of society from attaining their set
goals of financial success is anomic. Merton explained that the undue demand or
emphasis on citizens to achieve economic success without the commensurate social
structure accessible to all creates a strain in specific societal demographics, pushing
many to become deviants. This anomic situation is often referred to as part of strain
theory (Williams & McShane, 2014).
Strain Theory
Tibbetts and Hemmens (2009) said all forms of strain theory emphasize
frustration as one of the causative factors on issues related to criminality. Tibbetts and
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Hemmens argued that Durkheim’s theoretical framework was a vital influence on
Merton’s evolution of strain theory. Whereas Durkheim believed anomie was primarily
caused by a society’s transitioning too fast to maintain its regulatory control over its
citizenry, for Merton, anomie represented too much focus on wealth goals in the United
States at the expense of conventional means. Merton’s structural model became one of
the most cited theories of crime in criminological literature and one of the most popular
perspectives in criminological thought.
Bernard et al. (2016) claimed that Merton’s strain theory adapts Durkheim’s
anomie theory to the American society but focuses on social conditions. Merton’s strain
theory points out that any society’s culture defines specific goals that it deems worth
striving for and that the goals in every society vary from culture to culture. For example,
American society’s most prominent cultural goal is to acquire wealth associated with a
high degree of social status. Bernard et al. (2016) further highlighted how strain theory
uses cultural argument in explaining the high rate of crime in the American society,
which reveals a form of cultural imbalance to specify the approved norms or established
methods that individuals are expected to adapt in their pursuance of these cultural goals.
These adaptations were termed “conformity,” “innovation, “ritualism,” “retreatism,” and
“rebellion.” They act as severe strains on those who cannot achieve these societal,
cultural goals through legitimate means of hard work, honesty, and education. It also
reveals that strain affects different categories of people within a society but tends to
more strongly affect those in the lower class where the social structure significantly
limits the ability to achieve wealth. Even though there seems to be a form of uniformity
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within the various societal class structures, it creates a situation where everyone is under
pressure to accomplish wealth with a weak alliance to establish ways of attaining it.
Bernard et al. (2016) also claimed that strain theory’s intention focuses on the
specific problem of acute pressure that is created by the discrepancy between culturally
induced goals and structured opportunities and not to explain all the diverse deviant
behaviors that at one time or another is prohibited by law.
Adelaja et al. (2018) found that a significant part of northern Nigeria is engulfed
in poverty, limited economic opportunities, and unemployment. It was not surprising
that some residents from Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe (BAY States), where Boko
Haram’s attacks have been mainly concentrated, were of the firm opinion that
unemployment, poverty, economic hardship, and extreme political ideology were root
causes of terrorism in their respective states. They claimed that weak governance, the
high-handedness of security agents, and hatred of the government (institutionalized
structures) were significant causes of Boko Haram. These issues were a strain to many
in the lower class, especially the Almajiris, who distrusted the government. They felt
beholden to the terrorist group perceived as their freedom fighters.
Contemporary Strain Theory
Williams and McShane (2014) contended that anomie or strain theory was
initially viewed as a structural theory that focused on the effects of cultural changes and
inequality within society. With more recent theories emerging, they opined those
criminologists would find various methods to bring strain theory to the processual or
personal levels rather than the events themselves.
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General Strain Theory
One of the foremost contemporary strain theories can be linked to Agnew
(2006), who contended that conventional strain theories often look at problems
achieving positively valued goals, the inability to achieve whatever one wants or desires.
Agnew further argued that these strains may involve achieving positively valued goals
(e.g., money, status, autonomy). They might even entail the loss of positively valued
stimuli like assets. These strains made individuals or specific groups within the
community feel inadequate and use crime as a coping mechanism as a process of escape
from the stress.
Street boys (unemployed youths), armed gangs like the Almajirai, Yan Tauri,
Yan Daba, Yan Banga, and Yan Dauka Amarya in northern Nigeria, have made some
parts of the north, like Kano State, hot spots. These gangs are mostly the product of a
desire to resort to violence as a coping mechanism due to strain, which is characteristic
of the structural adjustment years. For Boko Haram, anything that gets in the way of
their valued goal must be destroyed, and violence is not a perversion of their Islamic
beliefs; it is viewed as a justifiable means to a pure end. General strain theory was
developed upon traditional strain theory in criminology in several ways. It focuses on
the actual or anticipated failure to achieve positively valued goal, the actual or expected
removal of positively valued stimuli, and the actual or expected negative stimuli
presentation. The theory also points to specific relevant dimensions of strain evaluated
in empirical research, including the magnitude, recency, duration, and bundling of
straining events (Adesoji, 2011; Agnew, 1992; Campbell, 2014; Williams & McShane,
2014).
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Containment Theory
Containment theory, also called control theory, is attributed to Walter Cade
Reckless. He attempted to integrate various concepts from other theories into a more
acceptable general theory of crime and delinquency. It addresses multiple factors and
focuses primarily on self-concept, the processes, and the functions related to it
(Mutchnick et al., 2009). The self-concept provides a good or bad image of oneself and
acts as a buffer to outside influences. It is also an explanation of conforming behavior
and deviancy. It has two reinforcing aspects: an inner and outer control system that
would enable a person to hold the line against deviancy or hue to social expectation.
Reckless’s emphasis on inner containment stated that self-concept existed in people and
formed at a young age, such as how the Boko Haram terrorist group cultivates the
Almajiris into their ideological beliefs mallams. He also stated a variation of pushes and
pulled toward deviant behavior that every individual experiences. This stimulus’s effects
of committing delinquent acts solely depend on the individual’s inner and outer
containment strength.
Containment theory is viewed as an all-encompassing perspective for the
explanation of criminality and delinquency. In contrast, others think it has attracted more
attention as a theory of delinquency, claiming that theory’s primary strength lies in its
integrated concepts of psychodynamic approaches of its day with the sociological
concepts of the Chicago tradition (Gibbons, 1976, cited in Mutchnick et al., 2009, p.
131). Control theorists assume that all people would naturally commit crimes if left to
their own devices. Thus, individuals commit crimes because the forces restraining them
from doing so are weak compared to the forces driving them toward criminality
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(Bernard et al., 2016). The ongoing Boko Haram violent experiences speak volumes to
the various theoretical postulations and their stance toward controlling crime within
society.
Collateral Consequences of Boko Haram and ISIS Terrorist Alliance in Nigeria
Terrorist acts and their devastating impacts are not limited to Nigeria but are
global. Researchers contended that the new face of terrorism was established following
9/11 (Olanrewaju, 2015). Terrorist activities are designed to make statements and are
forms of propaganda because terrorists knows that the media will cover sensational and
tragic events. Media reportage provides a venue for expressing what physically can be
done and the likely psychological effect on those who view their activities
(Ronczkowski, 2018). Terrorism comes in inhumane ways as varied as the definitions of
terrorism, whether to minimize the blow or discover why a terrorist activity took place,
being aware of the processes of terrorism assists the mainstream population in
identifying and cataloging serious terrorist events. Therefore, a pivotal step to defining
terrorism or acts of terrorism is developing an understanding of the various causes of
terrorism. Behind each act of terrorism lies a deeply rooted belief system characterized
by extremism and intolerance. Perspective is also a central consideration in defining
terrorism. Those opposed to an extremist group’s violent actions and those who see them
as terrorists might be targeted by the group. In contrast, those advocated by the group
would see them as liberation fighters, even when they are not in accord with their
methods. So, with many diverse definitions, terrorism can be viewed as the strategically
indiscriminate harming or threat of harming members of a target group to influence the
psychological state of spectators in ways the perpetrators anticipate may be beneficial to
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the advancement of their agenda or ideology (Martin, 2018; Ronczkowski, 2018;
Shanahan, 2016).).
Insurgencies and violent terrorist attacks in various Nigerian regions have
reached an alarming phase. Some schools of thought fear this may lead to the
disintegration of the country. The government’s inadequate response and its inability to
control the destabilizing activities of these terrorist groups allowed the sprouting up of
the ultra-religious terrorist group like Boko Haram (Joshua, 2020). The outbreak of the
Boko-Haram insurgency marked yet another stage and a recurring pattern of violent
uprisings, riots, and disturbances in Nigeria (Olanrewaju, 2015). The worst-hit region
has been the northeastern part of the country, where Boko Haram’s exploits have had
devastating effects on lives and properties. The Islamic indoctrination of Boko Haram
members is substantiated by the fact that the sect has declared in its manifesto that it is
committed to Islamizing Nigeria by implementing Sharia law. Spiritual ideology is
central to the group and provides an underlying basis for recruitment, motivating its
members to action. For instance, the Almajiris have been deliberately bred in Islamic
schools, nurtured, sheltered, rendered pliant, obedient to only one command line, and
ready to be unleashed at the rest of the society (Maiangwa et al., 2012).
An empirical analysis of the Boko Haram and ISIS terrorist alliance within the
study scope (2000–2020) in Nigeria uncovers a dark cloud hovering over the political
landscape. Nigeria’s topmost issue is viewed by many as the lack of visionary
leadership, corruption, and a failure of governance disguised by an inter-ethnic struggle
for political power and wealth. According to Ogbogu (2015), Boko Haram considers any
person or group of persons, including Muslims, who are not in line with their anti-
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Islamic beliefs deserving of death. Ogbogu also claimed that for Boko Haram, falling
under the ISIS banner could broaden its appeal and aid its recruitment. This recruitment
might be currently in place, where some suspect that many Almajiris in northern Nigeria
are indoctrinated or radicalized by establishing Islamic schools against Western-style
education.
International and Local Terrorist Indexes
The collateral consequences of Boko Haram’s alliance with ISIS could be
examined on many fronts. In terms of status, Boko Haram has boosted ISIS’s
international profile. The high unemployment rates, poverty, illiteracy, and absence of
basic amenities, especially in northern Nigeria, are fertile ground for Boko Haram
recruitment. And from the ISIS perspective, accepting Boko Haram as an ideological
proxy gives it a foothold in a region where the prevailing social, political, and economic
conditions are conducive for religious radicalization and recruitment (Ogbogu, 2015).
Second, as a rebel organization at war, ISIS seeks military victory in new territories.
Unlike many other jihadist groups, such as the Taliban, who seek to hold and govern
territory within a confined space, ISIS combines rebel governance with expansionist
territorial ambitions to create an Islamic Caliphate. For ISIS to achieve its expansionist
territorial goal globally, it requires tremendous manpower. Boots on the ground are not
enough. ISIS needs a dedicated fighting force willing to engage in self-sacrifice (Gates
& Podder, 2015). ISIS seeks global recognition on an international stage, and Nigeria is
a strong foothold in the African continent. Figures 6 and 7 reflect the death toll due to
terrorist activities both globally and within the African continent.
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Figure 6
Global Terrorism Index 2020

Figure 6 shows that Nigeria has one of the highest terrorism threat levels globally
and in Africa. In 2019, the terrorism index (Figure 7) in this West African country was
8.6, the highest so far in Africa. After Afghanistan, Nigeria recorded the second largest
number of terrorist-related deaths worldwide. Somalia, Congo, and Mali followed, with
some of the highest terrorism threat indexes globally. The Statista 2021 report (Figure 6)
shows an empirical analysis of the GTI ranking of Nigeria in 2020, which confirms the
objective of this study to reveal how pervasive terrorism has been in Nigeria and that the
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ISIS-backed Boko Haram terrorist activities were primarily responsible for the
undesirable top spot of Nigeria on the African terrorism index table while maintaining the
unenviable third spot after Afghanistan and Syria in the global terrorist index (Statista,
2021).
Figure 7
Terrorism Index in African Countries 2019
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Figure 8
Number of Deaths by Terrorism

Figure 8 shows the topmost terrorized countries globally with the highest number
of deaths as of 2019 by the percentage of those deaths. It is interesting to note how
Nigeria at 9% surpasses Iraq, Somalia, and Syria; each ranked at 4% respectively for
terrorist activities. Nigeria is ranked third after Afghanistan and the rest of the world in
2019, with 9% deaths from terrorist activities. The ranking makes Nigeria the third-most
terrorized country globally due to ISIS-backed Boko Haram insurgencies. My objective
in this case study is not to compare the terrorized countries of the world or the percentage
of deaths by terrorism but to statistically prove with empirical data the global security
threat that the Boko Haram and ISIS alliance in Nigeria poses (Statista, 2021).
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Figure 9
Number of Terror-related Deaths in African Countries Between 2007 and 2019

Figure 9 shows Nigeria as the country most affected by terrorism in Africa in
terms of fatalities. Between 2007 and 2019, Nigeria recorded 23,354 deaths in over 4,000
terrorist attacks. Quite a few radical groups are active in Nigeria, but Boko Haram is the
deadliest terrorist group and the only affiliate of the Islamic State (ISIS). Figure 8 also
adds credence in the effort by the research to show empirical evidence and bring
awareness that the current terrorist situation in Nigeria is endemic with devastating
potential if not contained by a global united security force (Statista, 2021).
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Figure 10
Number of Deaths in the Countries Most Impacted by Terrorism in 2019

Figure 10 also shows the global ranking of Nigeria with 1,245 deaths from
terrorism, second only to Afghanistan, which tops the chart with 5,725 fatalities. This
figure shows the worldwide significance and impact of the Boko Haram and ISIS alliance
in Nigeria.
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Figure 11
Deadly Terrorist Attacks in the Northeastern Region of Nigeria (Nigerian Northern
States Most Affected by Boko Haram’s Deadly Attacks 2011–2021)

Figure 11 shows that at the peak of terrorist activities in Nigeria, from 2011, Boko
Haram was responsible for thousands of deaths in Nigeria. This undesirable position
shows Nigeria as the country most affected by the terrorist group’s attacks. Figure 10 also
illustrates the states in the northeast with the number of terrorist-related deaths, and
Borno is the most threatened state. Boko Haram has caused about 32,800 deaths in this
state alone in the last 10 years. Despite this large number, only the news on the
kidnapping of 276 female students from Chibok secondary school in Borno in 2014
received the global media response. Currently, there are 112 girls still missing, and six
students are believed to have died (Statista, 2021).
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Ideology of Religion
The ideology of religion has made religious extremism a central issue for the
global community. It is viewed as a type of political violence driven by an absolute belief
that an otherworldly power has authorized and commanded terrorist violence for the
greater glory of the faith. It has become a mandatory ideology for many extremists
because it provides a worldview with a clear sense of purpose (Martin, 2017, 2018). After
9/11, the Western world started focusing more on one of the fastest-growing religions
globally with about 1.3 billion devotees, mostly Islam (Ronczkowski, 2018). Ahmed
(2015) stated that Islam is a code of life. It is not artificial, but it has come from our
creator, Allah. Islam is an Arabic phrase that means absolute surrender and submission to
a universal god, by the name “Allah.” Islam is a monotheistic afterlife religion that
follows Allah as the eternal all-powerful, all-knowing, and all-seeing god. And anyone
who submits to Allah and follows its teachings and practices Islam is known as a Muslim
or a submitter. The Islamic religious conviction follows a system of rituals that serves to
transform their religious beliefs into reality. These beliefs are based on five main pillars.
First is the creed declaring one’s allegiance, known as Shahadah. The second pillar is the
daily prayers known as Salat. The third is the annual charity duty of a Muslim, known as
Zakat, and the fourth pillar is the Saum or month of fasting (Ramadhan), the 9-month in
the Islamic lunar calendar. The fifth pillar is the Hajj, a journey to Mecca often carried
out in a Muslim’s lifetime (Denny, 2015; Ronczkowski, 2018). These pillars are viewed
by many as reformatory to help build an individual’s life in subservience to the ideology
of Islam as a religion.
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Olanrewaju (2015) stated the Salafists undoubtedly see themselves as reformers
who want to establish a sacred Islamic ideology that has been contaminated by Western
culture and doctrines of other Muslim groups like the Sufis and the Shiites. Other radical
groups that operate under this ideology are the Taliban and al Qaeda. Boko Haram is
also assigned to this branch of Islamic fundamentalism due to its beliefs, proclaimed
goals, targets, and activities. Olanrewaju further claimed that Boko Haram sought to
impose the Sharia laws across all Nigerian states because of the ideology to reject
Western education. Therefore, in keeping with the ideological similarity between Boko
Haram and other Salafi Jihadist groups, it is expected that they will most likely turn to
other established groups, such as the al Qaeda in the Maghreb, to learn how to unleash
more terror and create a Caliphate in Nigeria.
Leadership
The ongoing issue of terrorism is rooted in the failure of the Nigerian state to
provide competent leadership in effectively combatting Boko Haram terrorists.
Leadership is one of several issues dragging Nigeria into becoming a failed state.
Leadership failure has led to the collapse of the institutions and government capacity to
secure citizens’ lives and property (Joshua & Olanrewaju, 2016). According to Silva
(2016), leadership is an evolving concept. It could be adequately defined as the process of
interactive influence that occurs when some people in each context accept someone as
their leader to accomplish a common goal. These shared goals, such as shelter, security,
food, and good education, are basic needs globally, which in Nigeria are not any
different, even in the face of terrorist activities. Globalization is inescapable because, in
the information age, ongoing changes in technology and knowledge distribution dissolve
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the boundaries and borders of countries worldwide, bringing shared solutions to
significant security issues like terrorism (Goldsmith et al., 2003).
Awofeso and Odeyemi (2014) claimed that “leadership” has been so severally
defined that it has become increasingly difficult to arrive at a clear working definition.
Leadership is one of the challenging models to be given a comprehensive description
because it applies to every facet of life. For instance, one could describe it as the ability
to inspire confidence and support among those whose competence and commitment
determine performance. When illustrated in its political strand, leadership implies the
team of humans that run the public affairs of a particular political territory. Leadership
and leading activities are obtainable in the home, at work, and religious settings, and
invariably certain groups expect a leadership aura. Leadership is essential to
demonstrating better-quality governance, which enhances societal development because
it influences a structured group to implement actions to set and attain goals. The
discourse on the peaceful future of Nigeria is strictly connected to the failure of
governance and leadership (Nicholas-Omoregbe et al., 2016).
Nigeria is abundantly endowed by fortune with human and material resources
critical for national development and advancement. Today, Nigeria is a conglomeration
of hundreds of ethnic groups spanning several geographical zones (Falola et al., 2018).
The Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 Constitution established a framework for
democratic governance based on a presidential and not parliamentary system of
government, with a two-chamber National Assembly (Senate and House of
Representatives) and organizes Nigeria as a Federal Republic (Wehner, 2002). It is a
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colossal task to govern a society, but it becomes more daunting in Nigeria and countries
with an uncertain sociopolitical and economic environment (Dike, 2014).
Nigeria is seemingly stuck in the impoverished, corrupt, and underdeveloped
country with infrastructural decay yet excellent prospects at independence and was hyped
to lead Africa out of the backwoods of underdevelopment, economic dependency crisisriven, morally bankrupt, and leadership-deficient countries. However, since gaining
political independence from the British in 1960, Nigeria has continued to ramble on the
path befitting disastrous, anemic, and infantile states. Thus, one cannot but agree that
Nigeria is a victim of poor leadership and intricate systemic corruption that has become
more pervasive and cancerous (Imhonopi & Ugochukwu, 2013).
Internally Displaced Persons
As defined by its constitution, one of the cardinal objectives of the Nigerian state
is to build a just and democratic society where every member has the right to participate
in its governance process. This constitutional declaration takes for granted that every
citizen has the right to live and carry out their legitimate business freely in any part of the
country without fear of intimidation, discrimination, exclusion, or forced ejection.
However, local internal conditions like the Boko Haram and ISIS insurgency have caused
internal displacement; the internally displaced persons (IDPs) transcend the local nationstate of Nigeria. Its consequences impact the larger international community. It is a
global conundrum (Akume, 2015).
Nigeria is currently ranked third behind Syria with 6.5 million IDPs and
Colombia with 5.7 million IDPs. The IDPs in Nigeria are victims of tribal conflict,
insurgency, religious conflict, natural disaster, amongst others. The unparalleled surge
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and rise of IDPs across the nation are caused by the increased number of Boko
Haram/ISIS-backed terrorist attacks that have forced many victims out of their houses
(Amuda, 2019).
One of the collateral consequences of the Boko Haram and ISIS insurgency in
Nigeria, especially in the northeastern states, from 2009 to date, aside from insecurity,
poverty, hunger, destruction of properties, and loss of lives, has been the unprecedented
growth of internally displaced persons (IDPs). Apart from displacements due to natural
occurrences like flooding and communal clashes, 85.68% of these instances were caused
by the Boko Haram insurgency. These statistics confirm that insurgency has primarily
been responsible for the internal mass displacement of people, especially in Borno,
Adamawa, and Yobe States, the epicenter of insurgent activities in northeastern Nigeria
since 2009 (see Figure 11). Recurrent Boko Haram terrorist activities have caused
wanton loss of lives, property destruction, and economic disruption in these areas. Forced
to flee, the residents are crammed into camps as IDPs in Maiduguri metropolis. Many
others squat with poor host families in the city in dire conditions devoid of privacy, basic
hygiene, and conveniences. This crisis can be linked to poor governance and religious
extremism, characterized by bombing, kidnapping, and destruction of lives and property
(Raji et al., 2021).

63
Figure 12
Number of Internally Displaced Persons in Nigeria

Abdulazeez and Oriola (2018) claimed that the primary targets of Boko Haram
from 2009–2014 were private citizens and their properties (35% or 429 incidents). They
documented that while over 50% (5,640 casualties) of Boko Haram’s killings occur
amongst private citizens and properties, the police are also their second main target (17%
or 213 events). Boko Haram has displaced 2 million people, sent 44,800 refugees to
Cameroon, with about 15,000 people to the Republic of Chad, and ousted over 105,000
persons to Diffa and other regions in neighboring Niger. Now, other IDPs also reside in
various locations within Nigeria. It is recorded that in 2015, Borno State had about 36
official IDP camps (Abdulazeez & Oriola, 2018). Also, IDP camps exist in Adamawa,
Yobe, Bauchi, Plateau, Kano, and Gombe states, and Abuja (see Figure 12).
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IDPs have become concerned that camp officials (State Emergency Management
Agency [SEMA] staff, security personnel, representatives of IDPs, and National
Emergency Management Agency [NEMA]) supervisors) deprive them of relief materials
through intentional hoarding and outright theft. Due to the current insecurity, especially
in northeastern Nigeria, the IDPs are not fed three meals a day. Also, the availability of
food in the camp stores does not translate to regular meals. Participants stated that 12–1
p.m. is when breakfast is served at most camps. Lunch is skipped, so the late breakfast is
often followed by dinner. Hunger is a daily reality among IDPs. Abdulazeez and Oriola
(2018) noted the criminogenic patterns at the IDP camps with the large-scale influx of
relatives and friends of camp officials into the camps just before any IDP camps visited
by political leaders or dignitaries. The illicit idea behind this program is to enable camp
officials to have an adequate body count to justify the inflated IDP numbers they report,
the financial allocations, and the material support received from the government. These
corrupt schemes amount to the use of ghost IDPs (Abdulazeez & Oriola, 2018).
Education
One of the significant collateral consequences of terrorism in Nigeria is the
collapse of the educational system, especially in the northeast. This is the reality,
especially in north Nigeria, where the ISIS-backed Boko Haram group holds dominance.
The battle between Nigerian security forces and Boko Haram has intensified the current
underdevelopment and regional inequalities, especially in education between the north
and south. The most defenseless and affected demographic populations are children,
youths, and women. The mechanism used by Boko Haram to achieve their lethal
operations includes kidnapping, suicide bombings, sexual violence against womenfolk,
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and recruitment of young men like the Almajiris (Ojo, 2020). The Boko Haram is
ideologically based on and tailored toward a particular Islamic educational doctrine that
detests Western civilization and its academic influence. It is no wonder that Nigeria is
consistently occupying the third position (see Figure 4) in global rankings on the impact
of terrorism (Akwara, 2020; Nnam et al., 2020).
In Nigeria, achieving good-quality or even basic education, particularly in the
northern region, has been a terrifying experience for many families since the Boko Haram
activities became more intense and extreme over a decade ago. Many of these terrorist
raids have impacted the education sector, causing partial school closures and loss of lives
and properties. The most notable terrorist attack on the Nigerian educational system that
caught global attention was the kidnapping of the Chibok girls by Boko Haram. This
horrible incident occurred on April 15, 2014, when 276 female students at the
Government Secondary School, Chibok in the Borno State of Nigeria, were kidnapped,
coerced as sex slaves, and forced to accept Islamic doctrines and teachings (Nnam et al.,
2020). The abductees, their families, Nigerians, and the global communities are forever
traumatized by the ordeal of these kidnappings (Ngwama, 2014).
Several kidnappings of other school children have continued, especially when
these acts are rewarded with substantial ransom payments. Other copycat insurgent
groups like the Fulani herdsmen, or bandits, have emerged in what seems to be a
profitable kidnapping venture in Nigeria. Boko Haram insurgency impairs the
management of education. When education institutions are targeted or attacked, the
damage and collateral consequences can be significant and far-reaching. It is often
difficult to keep these schools open due to the fear of reprisal attacks by terrorist groups
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(Medugu, 2017). Joshua and Olanrewaju (2016) admitted that it is important to stress that
because Western education is the principal target of Boko Haram, education has been the
worst hit in the orgy of violence committed by the group. Boko Haram terrorist activities
have further deepened the education imbalance between the north and the south. The
north remains grossly disadvantaged. The psychological trauma that both surviving
teachers and students experienced during these terrorist attacks would undoubtedly
impact their teaching and learning abilities without proper therapeutic resources
(Medugu, 2017).
Impact on Education
My purpose in this case study was to identify and analyze with empirical data the
impact of the Boko Haram and ISIS terrorist insurgency on one of the agents of
socialization (education) in northeastern Nigeria. The effect on education reveals that
northeast Nigeria has the lowest educational enrollment rate of 37.8% (Statista, 2021).
Figure 13 below shows the gross enrollment rate, which measures the enrollment
rates of the scholars at any age, rather than the net enrollment rates which, refers only to
students in the official age for that specific educational level. The gross enrollment rate
in Nigerian middle schools was 54.4% in 2018. States in the southeastern region
registered the highest figures, with 52.5% for males and 59.8% for females. Nationwide,
Imo, and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) had the highest rates. However, the data
show that there were relevant differences between the northern and southern states.

67
Figure 13
Enrollment Rate in Private and Public Lower Secondary School in Nigeria as
of 2018

The northeastern states had the lowest enrollment rates of 37.8% for males and
37% for females. This case study’s objective is not to compare the gender of students
enrolled in various regions within the Nigerian state but to show with empirical data the
impact of the Boko Haram and ISIS alliance on education in northeastern Nigeria
(Statista, 2021).
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Corruption
There are some difficulties in defining “corruption,” especially when considering
how it is measured or modeled. Jain (2001) referred to corruption as acts in which the
power of the public office is used for personal gain in a fashion that violates the rule of
the game. Many researchers have asserted that violent extremism in Nigeria today is a
consequence of decades of insidious corruption and neglect of governance (Evans &
Kelikume, 2019). Heywood and Rose (2015) argued that corruption increases
bureaucratic inefficiency, reduces tax returns, challenges political legitimacy, and is
fundamentally unethical. According to Ademu (2013), corruption involves injecting
additional but improper transactions to change the moral course of events and alter
judgments and positions of trust. It consists of the doers (i.e., givers) and receivers’
informal, extra-legal, or illegal acts to facilitate matters.
Corruption is a commonplace word in the language of every Nigerian citizen.
Corruption is widespread in the home, street, associations, groups, public and private
bureaucratic organizations, traditional institutions, and even religious institutions. The
collapse of the Nigerian traditional institutions, failure of public enterprises, decay and
inefficiency of our public service, and the failure of private entrepreneurs to function in
our society as agents of change, growth, and development are considered consequences
of corruption in our community and body polity. Corruption in all its consequences is a
social problem. The causes of corruption are well beyond any individual or institution; it
affects society (Bassey et al., 2013). As widespread as corruption is in many countries,
very little is understood about what triggers corruption to be greater in one situation than
another (Treisman, 2000).
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Awofeso and Odeyemi (2014) contended that from the outset of Nigeria’s
independence attainment, successive sets of the nation’s political leaders and decisionmakers at all levels of public life have established systemic corrupt acts and abusive
behavior in the country and have thus severely constrained the nation’s development
potentials. The Boko Haram and ISIS alliance, which has been (re)christened ISIS-West
Africa (ISWA), has changed the northeast to a theater of war. States like Sokoto,
Zamfara, Kaduna, and Kastina have become a rendezvous for bandits, marauders,
kidnappers, and a host of hoodlums. It has been argued that the current security
challenges were the results of corruption strewn in Nigerian state managers’ minds (Ojo,
2020).
Poverty
There are various definitions and perceptions by the society of what or who
should be labeled as living in poverty. Gabe (2013) asserted that poverty in the United
States and globally is often defined for statistical purposes, especially if those categorized
by these societal statistics as living in poverty have their family’s countable money
income below the corresponding poverty threshold. When the goals and means of
achieving financial success (a leap out of poverty) within a society are not equally
stressed, the anomic condition is formed. And without reasonable access to these socially
acceptable means of success, citizens within that society will attempt to discover other
means of financial freedom. According to Merton’s strain theory, these means are called
“modes of adaptation” (Williams & McShane, 2004., p.82).
The alarming poverty in Nigeria represents an absurdity in contrast to the
abundant human and physical resources in the country. It is even more distressing that
notwithstanding the vast human and material resources allotted to poverty reduction by
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successive governments, no evident success has been achieved in this direction (Apata et
al., 2010). Poverty in Nigeria is a reality; it is widespread across the country and severe.
It depicts a lack of food, clothes, education, housing, and other basic amenities.
Unemployment significantly contributes to poverty in Nigeria. Unemployment-induced
poverty tends to increase the country’s crime rate and violence level. Poverty is the
primary motivation for unemployed Nigerian youth (especially in the northeast) who
resort to terrorism, armed banditry, kidnapping for ransom, internet fraud, and other
criminal activities (Ucha, 2010). These unemployed youths were often targeted as
prospective recruits for terrorist groups like Boko Haram. By 2008, Boko Haram had
established their institutions such as the Shura Council, offered a rudimentary welfare
system, provided jobs, and gave out microfinance loans for members to start
entrepreneurial ventures that would help narrow the income distribution gap (Walker,
2018).
Evans and Kelikume (2019) claimed that the income distribution in Nigeria is
highly skewed, implying that most people live in poverty. The authors affirmed that
Nigeria is also poorly governed, and that poverty is a significant cause of Boko Haram
terrorism. Thus, increased terrorism is overtly triggered by poverty. The Boko Haram
and ISIS alliance has exploited this poverty, especially in the northeast, through acts of
entrepreneurial loans to youths (potential recruits) as a benefit of joining their group.
According to Botha and Abdile (2019), poverty, employment opportunities presented by
Boko Haram, being frustrated with life, and lack of education can be designated as
essential factors contributing to people’s decision to join Boko Haram.
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Terrorism and Poverty
Figure 14 shows that in 2019, the Nigerian states of Sokoto and Taraba had the
most substantial fraction of the population living below the poverty line. The poverty
rate is much higher in most of the northern than in the southern states. The south and
southwestern states had the lowest poverty rates recorded. In Lagos, this figure was
4.5%, the lowest rate in Nigeria (see figure 14). Individuals are considered poor in
Nigeria when they earn less than 137.4 thousand Nigerian naira (roughly 361 U.S.
dollars) per year. Overall, about 40.1% of the population lives in poverty.
Figure 14
Poverty Headcount Rate in Nigeria as of 2019, by State

Source: NBS, Poverty and Inequality in Nigeria-2019 Poverty
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In Figure 14, the case study research intention was not to compare the poverty
rates of the states in Nigeria but to illustrate with empirical evidence and bring awareness
to how devastating the current terrorist insurgency is taking its toll on the citizens,
especially in the northeast.
Fulani Herdsmen/Bandits
One of the collateral consequences of terrorist activities in Nigeria is its impact on
livestock herders known as Fulani herdsmen. According to Akpor-Robaro and LanreBabalola (2018), the Fulani herdsmen are overwhelmingly Muslim (99.9%), with pure
nomadic or semi-nomadic lifestyles. They have lived thus since the early Islamic jihads
to date. Historically, the Fula ethnic group from which Fulani herders originate has a
culture of warfare and conquest to livelihood and survival.
The Fulani contribute to a significant part of the Nigerian economy. They are the
major breeders of goats, sheep, and cattle, which are the primary sources of meat and
affordable animal proteins consumed by Nigerians (Ajibefun, 2018). Okeke (2014)
argued that the gradual southward expansion of the Hausa-Fulani is responsible for
ongoing ethno-religious conflicts in the Central states of Nigeria, especially in Plateau,
Nasarawa, and the Benue States. According to Akpor-Robaro and Lanre-Babalola (2018),
the Fulani herdsmen may well be Boko Haram in a different package. Advancing the
objectives of the Islamic terrorist sect by infiltrating the southern part of the country
which, the conventional or regular troops have not been able to penetrate. Most
problematic in the current development is the pillaging, raping, killing, and kidnapping of
citizens by the Fulani herdsmen. Ajibefun (2018) also claimed that Nigeria is under a
severe internal security threat with economic, political, and environmental dimensions.

73
Each dimension has critically impacted the nation’s stability and can be traced to many
factors in which the Fulani herdsmen appear to play a significant role. The relentless
attacks on the civilian populace by the Fulani have forced the implementation of a law
against open grazing in some states, such as Benue, in the northcentral region (Ojo,
2020).
Olaniyan and Yahaya (2016) stated that the Fulani views cattle herding not
necessarily as a delightful endeavor but as a profitable vocation that is challenging,
strenuous, and exhausting. Thus, cattle serve multiple purposes, including providing milk
and beef, the opportunity to breed cattle and beautify stock, and act as carriers and
sources of income. The authors also claimed that the Fulani have practiced cattle raiding
for many years as a cultural pattern showing their prowess and restocking depleted
inventory. It is generally nonmilitarized. However, the current spate of rustling is heavily
militarized and deadly. In essence, the shadow economy, in this case, acts as an outlet for
stolen cows and brings in a lot of cash. The herders’ cash-based form of trading has been
identified as a source of funding for terrorist groups in northern Nigeria. The Nigerian
government’s response to this emerging security threat has been relatively slow and
generally reactive. In 2014, a concerted effort started to contain the insurgency (Olaniyan
& Yahaya, 2016). Still, this reactive response by the Nigerian State to the multiple
insecurity issues is perceived as one of the reasons by some ethnic, regional groups
seeking self-determination.
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Quest for Ethnic Self-Determination
The yearning for self-determination by ethnic national groups is not strange to
global politics, and Nigeria is no exception. Different ethnic groups have always sought
determination, which is even more pertinent because the United Nations Charter of 2007
recognized the right to self-determination by ethnic minorities (Johnson & Olaniyan,
2017). Nigeria is in West Africa. It is densely populated, highly heterogeneous, and in
2019, its population (the largest in Africa) was over 200 million people, consisting of
Christians, Muslims, and other religious groups. Since Nigeria became independent from
Britain in 1960, it has spent more time under military than civilian rule (Asuni, 2009;
Varella, 2020). Some scholars claimed that more than 350 ethnic groups in Nigeria have
different cultures and beliefs. Salawu (2010) asserted that Nigeria has over 400 ethnic
groups belonging to several religious sects and has remained a multi-ethnic nation-state
since independence. Salawu added that Nigeria has grappled with ethnicity and multiple
insecurities largely attributed to ethno-religious conflicts in several communities. Nigeria
can be justifiably described as one of Africa’s most deeply divided states (Osaghae &
Suberu, 2005).
According to Guichaoua (2010), Nigeria has repeatedly struggled with the
national question about bringing its highly diverse ethnic and religious constituents
together into one federal state. Three majority groups account for 50% of the population:
the Hausa-Fulani (north), the Yoruba (southwest), and the Igbo (east). Minority groups
are mainly present in the Middle Belt or the coastal Niger Delta region (south-south).
Ethnic groups have ascribed membership and are usually, but not always, based on
claims or myths of shared history, ancestry, language, race, religion, culture, and territory
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(Ukiwo, 2005). Ukiwo claimed that ethnicity was a weapon implemented and boosted by
regionally based elites to acquire state power and the affluence it guarantees. Ordinary
Nigerians had nothing against each other; it was the elites that mobilized them against
one another. The agitation for self-determination from some of the major ethnic and
minority groups is growing by the day within the Nigerian polity, especially with the
onslaught of terrorist activities gradually moving toward the southern region from the
northeastern part. Anugwom (2000) argued that ethnicity is when a group of people, no
matter how small, with cultural and linguistic attributes different from its neighbors, use
this as the basis of solidarity and interaction with others. The Boko Haram and ISIS
alliance in Nigeria regards themselves as a distinct group fighting for the Islamization of
the entire Nigerian state.
The Southeastern Region: Indigenous People of Biafra
In 1967, the Igbo ethnic group of southeastern Nigeria attempted to secede from
the Nigerian state by declaring the Biafra Republic. Before that declaration, concerted
efforts were made to appease all parties involved, but all were ineffective. This secession
attempt resulted in a 3-year war (1967–1970) that killed millions of people in the
southeastern region and inflicted massive destruction of property and the environment
(Johnson & Olaniyan, 2017). Over 50 years after the civil war, the wound, especially
with the Igbos, is still undergoing healing processes. Ugorji (2017) stated that in the early
2000s, new eruptions of agitation for the independent state of Biafra started. The first
nonviolent social crusade to gain public attention was called the Movement for the
Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), founded by Ralph
Uwazuruike, a trained lawyer. The activities of MASSOB also led to confrontations with
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law enforcement at different times and the arrest of its leader. Still, unlike Boko Haram, it
received little attention from the international media or the global community.
Nnamdi Kanu, a Nigerian-British man based in London and born at the end of the
Nigeria-Biafra war in 1970, was concerned that the ambition for the independence of
Biafra would not be realized through MASSOB. He decided to use the evolving mode of
communication, social media, and online radio (Radio Biafra) to inspire millions of proBiafra independence activists, supporters, and sympathizers to his Biafran cause (Ugorji,
2017). Nnamdi Kanu’s approach was a game-changer with the establishment in 2012 of
the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB). The sole objective was to restore the dream of
an independent state of Biafra in the southeastern part of Nigeria. IPOB came into the
limelight in 2015, and for activism, primarily engaged social media, a website, and
launched Radio Biafra, which notably garnered support and sympathizers as well as
international attention for the Biafran struggle.
IPOB’s members are mainly youths from the Igbo ethnic extraction in Nigeria and
the diaspora. The group’s leader, Nnamdi Kanu, was arrested in October 2015 and
charged with treason, and despite court injunctions for his release, the Nigerian
government continued to detain him illegally (Chiluwa et al., 2020). Chiluwa et al. also
claimed that Kanu’s detention led to several protest marches. These protests and clashes
with state security forces preceded several killings and led the Nigerian government to
label IPOB a terrorist group. Kanu jumped bail (while on charge for treasonable felony)
when released on health grounds in April 2017; however, the Nigerian security forces
invaded his family home not too long after his release. In June 2021, he was re-arrested in
collaborative security schemes with the Kenyan authorities (Chiluwa et al., 2020). This
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government action and the labeling of IPOB as a terrorist group has further spread the
pro-Biafra message and propagated the group at the international level. However, the
group is not known to commit the same atrocities of kidnapping, bombing, or killing
women and children as Boko Haram. Their ideology is very different from that of the
Boko Haram ISIS alliance, as they claim to strive for ethnic self-determination.
The Niger Delta Region (South-South): Movement for the Emancipation
of the Niger Delta (MEND)
The 36 states of Nigeria are subdivided into six geopolitical zones (Figure 14),
made up of six states each. The south-south zone consists of the following states, moving
from east to west: Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo, and Rivers. The term
Niger Delta generally symbolizes these states, and all except Cross River states are oil
producers. Therefore, it expanded to include Imo, Abia, and Ondo states since they are oil
producers. The Niger Delta has about 140 different ethnic groups in the nine states
included in the broader definition of the region. These states are the goose that lays the
golden eggs for the Nigerian economy, yet they are still underdeveloped in basic living
infrastructure and poverty alleviation for their residents (Asuni, 2009).
The long years of neglect and deprivation amid plenty of natural resources, along
with the insensitivity of successive governments and the exploitation by the oil
companies, had by the late 1990s created a volatile atmosphere characterized by protests,
agitations, and conflicts in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. This region produces 80%
of the country’s foreign earnings. The crises in the Niger Delta manifest in various ways
such as militancy, hostage-taking, kidnapping oil workers, the extermination of oil and
gas installations/facilities, and systematic disruption of oil production activities.
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Figure 15
Six Geopolitical Zones in Nigeria, Their States, and Their Economic Activities

Source: jlukmon. (2017, February 9). How many geopolitical zones are in Nigeria? List.
ABOUT NIGERIANS. https://aboutnigerians.com/how-many-geopolitical-zones-are-innigeria-list/

The top militant groups in the region are the Movement for the Emancipation of
the Niger Delta (MEND), led by Henry Okah; the Niger Delta Vigilante Force (NDVF),
led by Ateke Tom; the Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force (NDPVF), led by Alhaji
Asari Dokubo; the Bush Boys, the Martyrs Brigade, and many others. Some militants,
such as Dokubo and Tom Polo, have portrayed themselves as freedom fighters. These
militant groups emerged as representatives of their communities to battle against the
Federal government and oil companies’ greed and exploitative policies (Ogbonnaya &
Ehigiamusoe, 2013; Asuni, 2009).
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For the past decades, the political instability in Nigeria partly stems from its
peculiar political economy accredited to the vast natural resources of the Niger Delta
region. According to Guichaoua (2010), the repressive governing methods and opaque
management of the oil rent have prevented harmonious political and redistributive
institutions, despite Nigeria’s federal polity. This neglect by successive Nigerian
governments further gave grounds for hostility within the region, almost crippling the
economy. Ogbonnaya and Ehigiamusoe (2013) noted that hostage-taking and kidnapping
soon became the operational activities of many militant groups in the region. The skill
with which the militants operate coupled with the sophisticated nature of their weapons
has defied all curbing measures. Many questions include the source of the militants’
firearms and how they receive the military experience or combat training. Some
researchers have asserted that militancy in the region has assumed several criminal
dimensions rather than the initial legitimate struggle for the emancipation of the region.
While the security challenges thrown up by the crisis in the Niger Delta were being
contained, the Boko Haram insurgency surfaced with bombing attacks and killings, with
the northeastern region as the epicenter of their terrorist activities. These terrorist
activities have been a significant security challenge for the Nigerian military, especially
with the complex weaponry accessible to the terrorist groups.
The Southwestern Region: The Oodua People’s Congress
One of the many revolutionary groups seeking self-determination that has gained
prominence due to Nigeria’s current state of insecurity is the Oodua People’s Congress
(OPC), situated in the southwestern region. According to Guichaoua (2010), the OPC is
named after Oduduwa. He was the mythological ancestor of the Yoruba. OPC is one of
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the largest ethnic militias in contemporary Nigeria. It was created in August 1994 under
divergent circumstances: the frustrated promises of democratic transition and the fierce
repression of political opposition under the highly corrupt and repressive military rule of
General Sani Abacha. The late Frederick Fasehun, a highly educated medical doctor, was
a union and human rights activist before becoming an ethnic leader. OPC is very
prominent in the states demographically dominated by the Yorubas, Lagos, Edo, Ekiti,
Ogun, Osun, Oyo, Ondo, Kwara, and Kogi states. OPC’s objectives, duly written in its
constitution, have a classic nationalist tang, extolling the need to preserve the Yoruba
cultural and social legacy. The predominant political claim of the OPC is the organization
of a Sovereign National Conference to redraw the rules of the Federation toward greater
autonomy for the regions (Guichaoua, 2006, 2010). Olarinmoye (2010) asserted that the
OPC emerged initially as a Yoruba socio-cultural organization under Fasehun, viewed as
the moderate faction ready to engage the government in dialogue. But with consistent
criticism of how the government was handling the insecurity issue and the need for
regional autonomy, Fasehun was arrested and imprisoned by the military government led
by General Sani Abacha.
The new leadership of OPC under Fasehun’s deputy Gani Adams quickly evolved
into the militant wing with a more aggressive approach, embracing vigilantism to curb
the state of insecurity that was enveloping the nation. Aidonojie and Egielewa (2020)
argued that the Federal government’s internal security agent controls are deficient and
ineffective in responding to the commissioning of a crime. Desperate times call for
desperate measures to be adopted. In response to the growing insecurity within
southwestern Nigeria, on January 9, 2020, the governors of these regions adopted
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extreme measures to curb criminality by creating an internal security group known as the
Amotekun. This regional security outfit was to complement the role of the Nigerian
police and create job opportunities for youths within the southwest region. Today, the
new poster boy for the agitation of a Yoruba nation is Sunday Adeniyi Adeyemo, also
known as Sunday Igboho. Given the success in creating the security outfit in the
southwest, other regions saw the emergence of security outfits like the Eastern Security
Network (ESN). Some of these regional security outfits established to defend lives and
properties of Boko Haram terrorist attacks have come under heavy criticism and attack by
the Federal government of Nigeria, who labels them as illegal security agencies that
should be disbanded.
Gaps in Research
Terrorist acts carried out in the northeastern part of Nigeria by Boko Haram have
created a battlefield that has left thousands of people dead in its wake. There is scant
literature on the collateral consequences of Boko Haram’s sworn allegiance in March
2015 to ISIS, with its attendant global security threats. According to Adesoji (2010),
Islamic fundamentalism’s growing problem appears to be more deeply rooted than are
the Nigerian government’s approaches to address it. Given the danger the Boko Haram
terrorist activities pose to the country, its root causes of poverty, unemployment, and
lack of social infrastructure need to be tackled with comprehensive and sweeping
measures. Botha et al. (2017) found that much empirical evidence supported the key
historical, political, social, economic, and religious ideological factors that continue to
galvanize and mobilize Boko Haram. Among these are corruption, unemployment,
unequal access to resources, political (governance) and economic structures, extreme
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interpretation of religious scriptures and intolerance, lack of education and historical
tensions over cohabitation between Muslims and Christians, and absence of dependable
sources of financing. Culp (2019) recommended that future research expand the breadth
of cases by exploring other like-minded Islamic transnational terrorist groups’ writings,
speeches, and actions.
Additionally, future studies could include strategies outlined by another post9/11 jihadist strategist for their possible impact on shaping ISIS’s terrorism approach.
This approach should create a relationship between terrorism strategists and terrorist
organizations as inroads into new territorial targets. ISIS’s acceptance of Boko Haram’s
allegiance summarizes some of these strategies.
The literature suggested that the Nigerian government has not successfully
warded off the coalition’s aggression. This dissertation intends to fill that gap. This
research, dictated by its rareness, will apply anomie and strain’s central theories. Other
theoretical explanations will also be examined to mirror the instability attributed to Boko
Haram and its allegiance to ISIS, the destruction of the northeastern part of Nigeria, and
the dangerous progression to other parts of the country.

CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY
Case Study Research
This dissertation is a case study and analysis of academic research on the
insurgency of Boko Haram terrorism-related to Nigeria. It is primarily terrorist ideologyassociated issues, impact of terrorism in Nigeria on education, economic and povertyrelated challenges, the associated risk of reintegrating former Boko Haram members,
Nigerian military response, and religiosity, which is often used as a magnetic pull for
potential recruits globally. The case study using the qualitative method was applied for
this dissertation study, and no hypothesis was required. The case study application added
awareness to terrorist insurgencies in Nigeria. Its application was also to understand the
complex nature of terrorism carried out by members of the Boko Haram group in
Nigeria and areas for future research. The case study qualitative research design method
was conducted by collecting relevant data, analyzing the data information sourced from
Google scholar, Texas Southern University e-library, and the Global Terrorism
Database, and reporting the findings systemically. The entire culture-sharing group in
ethnography (descriptive anthropology) may be considered a case, but ethnography
intends to determine how the culture works (Creswell & Poth, 2016). According to
Creswell and Poth (2016), case study research chooses to view a case study as a
methodology. It is defined as a qualitative research approach where the investigator
explores real-life contemporary bounded systems (i.e., a case).
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Yin (1984) stated that case study research is an empirical inquiry investigating a
recent phenomenon within a factual context when the boundaries between the
phenomenon and context are unclear; it also involves multiple sources of evidence.
According to Yin (2014), case study research studies involving real-life issues,
contemporary context or setting, and the Boko Haram and ISIS terrorist collaboration fit
this description. This case study research relied on and compared extractions practically
from relevant secondary data such as articles, journals, and books used as leverage for
the study. This research also reviewed the social and economic impacts experienced in
Nigeria’s predominantly Muslim populated northern regions against their southern
neighbors. Emphasis was also on reported cases of conflict and violent attacks by Boko
Haram, leading to several loss of lives in Nigeria’s northern and Middle belt areas.
Analysis of existing academic writing and research explains how Boko Haram
evolved over the past 2 decades (2000–2020) into a resilient insurgency. I also analyzed
the factors (sworn allegiance to ISIS) that contributed to Boko Haram’s rapid rise, its
ability to conquer large territory, and its control of multiple population centers across
northeast Nigeria.
This research’s peculiarity as a continuum on terrorist activities in Nigeria used
relevant secondary data from google scholar, ProQuest, library search engines of various
institutions, the Global Terrorism Index (GTI). This involves a systematic evaluation of
social events by interpreting large amounts of qualitative data collections and
communications (Schreier, 2012; Neuendorf & Kumar, 2015). According to Yin (2009),
the type of analysis of these data will be an embedded analysis of the case’s specific
aspect under study. My goal was to observe how other scholars have approached
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terrorism and bring to light vital themes, processes, interactions that deserve more
extensive consideration (especially the alliance between Boko Haram and ISIS) and
their consequential impact on the Nigerian political space.
Research Participants
There were no research participants or population involved in this research study.
The study focus covering 2 decades (2000–2020) is principally a case study on an
alliance between two of the world’s deadliest terrorist groups, Boko Haram and ISIS.
The alliance between these groups has devastated Nigeria’s northeast and is moving
quickly across the entire nation. With the Nigerian government’s ineffective responses
in checkmating the country’s potential destruction so far, this alliance has collateral
consequences that threaten global security.
Data Collection /Sampling Procedure
The case study employed secondary data (e.g., journals articles, books,
government publications) from 2000–2020 as the primary data for research analysis. The
data collected were mainly from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) measurement, the
most critical database in the counter-terrorism domain, Google scholar, Texas Southern
University e-library, and the Global Terrorism Index (GTI) report a wide-ranging review
of global developments and creates patterns on terrorism. The GTI report obtains its data
from the GTD, the most authoritative data source on terrorism today. The GTD is
distinctive in that it consists of methodically and comprehensively coded data for 170,000
terrorist incidents. The GTI (2018) produces a composite score to provide an ordinal
ranking of countries on the impact of terrorism and helps research organizations find
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insights into unstructured or qualitative journals, articles, open-ended surveys, social
media, and web content. An in-depth analysis of an extensive range is required.
For this case study, face-to-face interviews and volunteers’ solicitation were not
needed for sampling. The research dissertation proposal was assigned protocol #1641.
The study was exempted from the Texas Southern University’s Institutional Review
Board (IRB) full committee review since it is secondary research for which consent was
not required. Therefore, the research procedures meet the exemption category set forth
by Federal regulation 45 CFR 46.104(d)(4), and it was duly exempted.
Research Instruments
This dissertation research is a bounded single-case study using a qualitative
method, and no hypothesis was required. The project did not involve human subjects,
animal models, radioactive materials, or recombinant DNA. The study used secondary
data from articles, scholarly journals, and books with five proposed research questions.
The research questions examine the alliance and collaborative consequences of the two
most dreaded terrorist groups globally, Boko Haram and ISIS. The questions guiding the
case study also explored education, poverty; it examines the Nigerian governments’
response to curbing the menace of terrorism. Finally, it explored the structural
deficiencies that may exist in the reintegration processes of former Boko Haram terrorist
members. These are the four core research questions:
Research Questions
RQ1: What impact does the insurgence of the Boko Haram and ISIS alliance
have on the agents of socialization (education) in Nigeria?
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RQ2: Does poverty impact the recruitment of foot soldiers for terrorist activities
in Nigeria?
RQ3: How effective has the Nigerian military’s response been in curtailing the
terrorist attacks orchestrated by the Boko Haram–ISIS alliance?
RQ4: What are the structural deficiencies in the risk assessment reintegration
processes for former Boko Haram members?
Qualitative Data Analysis Procedure
The case study research methodology, also defined as a qualitative approach,
enables the researcher to explore a real-life, current bounded system (case) or multiple
bounded systems (cases) over time through detailed, in-depth data collection that
involves multiple sources of information, reports on case description, and explains case
themes in a descriptive way (Creswell & Poth, 2016). This qualitative research study
approach is designed to examine the collateral consequences of terrorism and the Boko
Haram and ISIS alliance’s attendant global security threat. It explains that causal links in
real-life interventions are often too complicated for surveys or experimental strategies.

CHAPTER 4
PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS OF FINDINGS

In this case study, I aimed to identify and analyze the continuous terrorist
insurgency in Nigeria from 2000–2020. An additional aim was to examine Boko Haram
and ISIS and its attendant global security threat. The chapter presents the findings in this
case study founded on the four research questions prepared and based on the literature
reviews of the dissertation topic. The researcher’s ability to answer the research questions
cannot be overstressed in creating awareness of the researched dissertation topic. It is also
a prospect to bring to light a new perspective on the researched topic. Finally, it supports
this dissertation’s final chapter’s discussion, research, and policy recommendations
sections.
RQ1: What impact does the insurgence of the Boko Haram and ISIS alliance
have on the agents of socialization (education) in Nigeria?
The first research question dealt with the impact of the Boko Haram and ISIS
terrorist alliance on agents of socialization, such as education, in Nigeria. This case study
dissertation links the significant negative impact of the ISIS-backed Boko Haram terrorist
activities on Nigeria’s educational system to the low enrollment rate in private and public
lower secondary schools, especially in the northern region (see Figure 13). Findings from
these studies revealed that the Boko Haram insurgency impairs the management of
education. The most notable terrorist attack on the Nigerian educational system that
caught global attention was the kidnapping of the Chibok girls by Boko Haram. This
incident occurred on April 15, 2014, when 276 female students at Government Secondary
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School, Chibok, in the Borno State of Nigeria, were kidnapped, coerced into becoming
sex slaves, and forced to accept Islamic doctrines and teachings (Nnam et al., 2020). The
abductees, their families, Nigerians, and the global communities were forever
traumatized by the ordeal of these kidnappings (Ngwama, 2014).
Like the Chibok girls’ experience, the Boko Haram terrorist group in 2018
abducted 110 schoolgirls aged 11–19 years from the Government Girls Science and
Technical College in Dapchi, Nigeria. All the girls were later released except for Leah
Sheribu, a Christian girl who refused to convert to Islam. When education institutions are
targeted or attacked, the damage and collateral consequences can be significant and farreaching. It is often difficult to keep these schools open due to the fear of reprisal attacks
by terrorist groups (Medugu, 2017). Joshua and Olanrewaju (2016) asserted that it is
essential to emphasize that Western education is the principal target of Boko Haram.
Education has been the worst hit in the orgy of violence committed by terrorist groups.
Boko Haram terrorist activities have further deepened the education imbalance between
the north and the south.
The studies further revealed that most of the north remains grossly disadvantaged
educationally, having the lowest enrollment rates of 37.8% for males and 37% for
females. The psychological trauma that both surviving teachers and students experienced
during these terrorist attacks would undoubtedly impact their teaching and learning
abilities without proper therapeutic resources (Medugu, 2017). My intention in this study
was not to comparatively analyze the impact of insurgencies on agents of socialization in
the three major regions in Nigeria but to statistically prove the impact of terrorism on
education with empirical data. The literature reviewed through empirical studies
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confirmed the significant impact of the Boko Haram and ISIS terrorist insurgencies on
education.
RQ2: Does poverty impact the recruitment of foot soldiers for terrorist activities
in Nigeria?
The second research question highlights the impact of poverty on the recruitment
of foot soldiers for terrorist activities in Nigeria. Most of the literature reviewed and
available empirical data support that poverty has been linked to terrorist insurgencies in
Nigeria. According to Williams and McShane (2004), when the goals and means of
achieving financial success and a leap out of poverty within a society are not equally
stressed, an anomic condition is formed. Without reasonable access to these socially
acceptable means of success, citizens within that society will attempt to discover other
means of financial freedom. Merton’s strain theory calls these means “modes of
adaptation.” It is even more disturbing that notwithstanding the vast human and material
resources that have been allotted to poverty reduction by successive governments, no
evident success has been achieved in this direction (Apata et al., 2010).
Poverty is the primary motivation for unemployed Nigerian youth, especially in
the northeast, to resort to terrorism, armed banditry, kidnapping for ransom, internet
fraud, and other fraudulent activities (Ucha, 2010). These unemployed youths were often
targeted as prospective recruits for terrorist groups like Boko Haram. By 2008, Boko
Haram had established their institutions like the Shura Council, offered a rudimentary
welfare system, provided jobs, and gave out microfinance loans for members to start
entrepreneurial ventures that would help narrow the income distribution gap (Walker,
2018). The NBS 2019 poverty and inequality report attested that the Nigerian states of
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Sokoto and Taraba had the most significant proportion of the population living below
the poverty line. The poverty rate is much higher in most northern states, with Sokoto
state having the highest (87.73%) than the southern states in Lagos state having the
lowest rate (4.5%) due to the Boko Haram terrorist activities. Botha and Abdile (2019)
claimed that it is evident that poverty, the employment opportunities presented by Boko
Haram, being frustrated with life, and the lack of education, could be categorized as
essential factors contributing to people’s decision to join Boko Haram. This case study
with reviewed literature significantly linked the high poverty rate to insurgencies,
especially in the northeastern part of Nigeria (see Figure 14).
RQ3: How effective has the Nigerian military’s response been in curtailing the
terrorist attacks orchestrated by the Boko Haram–ISIS alliance?
The third research question of this case study centered on the effectiveness of the
Nigerian military’s response in curtailing the terrorist activities orchestrated by the Boko
Haram–ISIS alliance, and most of the literature reviewed supported that Boko Haram
terrorist activities have caused wanton loss of lives, property destruction, and economic
disruption in these areas. While empirical studies have affirmed the Nigerian
government’s significant investment in military resources in their fight to contain
terrorism, Onuoha et al. (2020) claimed that despite the rise in the security sector budget
from about US$1.44 billion in 2009 to US$2.81 billion in 2018, military-led
counterinsurgency operation in Nigeria still faces some notable funding challenges.
Mac Ginty & Richmond (2013) claimed that nonmilitary approaches are
increasingly being advocated as an alternative or additional strategy to successfully
address the growing problem of terrorism and insurgency. Research indicates that
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nonmilitary processes, including political negotiations, deradicalization, disengagement,
amnesty, and reintegration programs, have a better capacity to tackle the primary causes
of terrorism and produce sustainable peace. This case study was able to pointedly link the
incessant surge in the Boko Haram terrorist activities characterized by bombing,
kidnapping, wanton destruction of lives and property, especially in the northeastern part
of Nigeria, to the Nigerian government’s poor governance, inadequate military funding,
and reactive military responses (Raji et al., 2021).
So far, the efforts made at curbing insecurity have further escalated rather than
diminished it. The military’s involvement in internal security has worsened insecurity due
to the military’s unprofessional approach. De Montclos (2020) stated that since 2009,
Nigeria has not defeated the Boko Haram group despite the formation in 2015 of an
antiterrorist coalition with Cameroon, Chad, and Niger, the Multinational Joint Task
Force (MNJTF). Instead, it withdrew into super-camps, which have left the terrorist
group to roam free in northeastern Nigeria.
The statistic in figure 5 below shows the ratio of military expenditure to gross
domestic product (GDP) of Nigeria from 2009 to 2019. In 2019, military spending in
Nigeria amounted to about 0.46% of gross domestic product.
RQ4: What are the structural deficiencies in the risk assessment reintegration
processes for former Boko Haram members?
The fourth and final research question relates to the structural deficiencies in the
risk assessment reintegration processes for former Boko Haram terrorist group members.
The community reintegration processes for offending members of any society are critical
to public safety and create an opportunity for collaborative work by security agencies.
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According to most literature reviewed in this case study, several factors driving
radicalization are characterized into three analytical frames: push, pull, and personal
traits. Push factors explain the structural defects in a society that makes individuals into
violent extremism. These factors can be related to the strain theory that is the central
guiding theory of this study. Their examples are otherwise known as the root causes,
including bad governance, poverty and unemployment, vast socio-economic inequality,
illiteracy, political exclusion and ostracism, and state suppression. Understanding the
above factors is a necessary step in the deradicalization process. Deradicalization
principally targets the extreme version of radicalism, given that it aims to change the
violence-prone beliefs of an individual, even when they have not physically engaged in
the acts of violence (Onapajo & Ozden, 2020). However, Botha and Abdile (2019)
asserted that Boko Haram’s disengagement or being disillusioned about the organization
should not be interpreted as the person being deradicalized. Even individuals kidnapped
and forced into the organization (not initially radicalized and recruited) require
psychological assistance when returning to their families and the larger community.

CHAPTER 5
DISCUSSION
The primary purpose of this case study was to identify and analyze the continuous
terrorist insurgency in Nigeria (2000–2020). An additional aim was to examine the Boko
Haram and ISIS alliance and its attendant global security threat. Nigeria’s current
insecurity has overwhelmed its various government security agencies, with multiple
societal issues creating an atmosphere of capitulation after their inability to use force and
repression to contain the insurgencies. Instead of the expected dislodgement of the Boko
Haram terrorist groups, this situation has led to the resurgence of terrorist activities,
especially in the country’s northeast. In this chapter, I discuss the findings, limitations,
and study summary and proffer recommendations for future research and policies before I
conclude.
The pressure that these terrorist activities create has been distressing to millions of
unemployable youths who may have lost faith in their government’s ability to protect
their lives and properties. These youths like the Almajiris are enticed, radicalized, and
brainwashed into joining terrorist groups with the promise of self-emancipation. They
have become a wellspring of potential recruits for various groups to use as foot soldiers
in their desire to create a hold on the larger society in achieving their political, religious,
and ideological goals. The Nigerian government has tried through rehabilitation programs
to deradicalize these youths but has run into problems with the social experience of the
reintegrated former combatants. The communities still perceive them as dangerous
individuals who cannot be accepted back among them (Onapajo & Ozden, 2020).
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Transparency and community engagement through public enlightenment programs would
positively impact the government’s drive toward containing these terrorist acts.
In August 2021, the elite Nigerian military institution of the Nigerian Defense
Academy (NDA) in northern Nigeria was attacked by terrorists who killed senior military
personnel. It is one of the many security breaches that occur every Friday. Government
institutions like the NDA, where Jumaat prayers are open to the public, have terrorist
elements infiltrate their ranks through regular visits to the officer’s mess, spy on military
activities, and plan attacks on vulnerable targets. These terrorist elements are often
rebranded as bandits or unknown gunmen by the government, which is viewed as the
Nigerian government’s lackadaisical approach to tackling the issues related to terrorism.
This seemly apathetic stance by the government has to change to curb the insurgencies
because the gallantry of the men and women in the Nigerian military has never been in
doubt; they have excelled in various international peace-keeping missions. The issue has
always been with policy implementation and boosting the limited military resources to
combat terrorist groups within the Nigerian state. Nigerian leaders must be selfless in
ensuring that budgeted funds for arms acquisition are channeled toward getting the
needed military resources instead of misappropriating the funds. The lack of transparency
and accountability related to the purchase of military hardware and software has been the
bane of eradicating the terrorist activities in Nigeria.
Limitations
It is essential to affirm that this dissertation may not have identified all the issues
related to acts of terrorism by Boko Haram as a terrorist group in Nigeria. One significant
limitation of this case study is that the topics bordering terrorism are complicated and
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challenging to study empirically because there is no conclusive definition of terrorism or
what a terrorist is. It depends on the researcher’s position, mission, and the period in
which they seek to define terrorism (Ronczkowski, 2018). Terrorism is not limited to
abnormal circumstances or alien systems; it is also a potential in ordinary institutions and
unusual situations. It has been separately described as a ploy and plan, a crime and a holy
duty, a defensible reaction to oppression, and an inexcusable abomination (Bagaji et al.,
2012). As the cliché goes, one person’s terrorist can be another person’s freedom fighter.
While the case study has provided awareness and deep insight into the Boko
Haram and ISIS terrorist alliance’s global security threat in Nigeria, this research mainly
relied on secondary data. Generating primary data on terrorism from the terrorists
themselves is exceedingly complicated, unsafe, and expensive, and firsthand
information/statistics on the crime are often collated, classified, and controlled by
government security agencies. Understandably, these restrictive measures put in place by
the government and its security agencies are needed for its citizen’s safety but make it
difficult for the researcher to get primary data sources of statistics to report these
incidents to the scientific community empirically.
Recommendation for Future Research
Future studies should compare and analyze terrorist activities by Boko Haram and
ISIS-backed groups post-2020 within the 36 Nigerian states (including the federal capital
territory, Abuja) to see what could help reduce or eradicate these terrorist acts to promote
public safety. Future research can also study issues related to resource control from the
three major regions in Nigeria, which often act as a catalyst for equity and fairness in the
distributions of the nation’s income on natural resources. Finally, a comparative analysis
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can be made among West African states where ISIS-backed terrorist group activities are
relentless to establish a caliphate within the African continent.
Policy Recommendation
Community Engagement and Religiosity. There is no simple and no single
solution that can end these acts of terrorism; however, it is critical to emphasize that the
anticipated policy recommendations would prevent the same issues that led to the 1967–
1970 Nigerian civil war. Indeed, there has been an environment of rising frustrations and
absolute distrust for the Nigerian state over the years following distressing reports of
massive elite corruption, social injustice, exploitation of the masses, and failure to deliver
dividends of democracy (Onapajo & Ozden, 2020). More important, to address this rising
frustration among the public and continuous terrorist activities by Boko Haram, the
government must employ community engagement. The government should establish a
multidisciplinary force (made up of the military, police, the civil defense agencies spread
across the 36 states and 774 local government areas, nongovernmental agencies, and
community leaders) to counter these terrorist groups.
High Skills Training for Youths. Youth engagement in highly skilled
government training programs would go a long way in curbing the push to join these
terrorist groups. According to O’Connor (2009), terrorists’ modes of operation are
designed in three pivotal phases: research, planning, and execution. These phases can be
frustrated through early detection, discovery, and observation with active community
engagement. The government must involve the community in these counter-attack
collaborations, if nothing else, for intelligence gathering and trust-building between local
security agencies and organizations (Onwudiwe et al., 2016).
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Reintegration Supervisory Programs. The establishment of operation safe
corridor and setting up the Countering Violent Extremism agency codenamed the
National Security Corridor to counter-recruitment and mobilization into Boko Haram and
rehabilitate defectors headed by a psychologist is a step in the right direction. Even
though the program classified Boko Haram terrorist defectors into three categories: lowrisk, medium-risk, and high-risk defectors. The first two categories applied
disengagement, rehabilitation, and reintegration methods, while the high-risk defectors
were for prosecution. These processes (i.e., different supervisory models) should be
reviewed to align with global best practices and tailored to fit the Nigerian system.
Criminal justice professionals, social workers, and trauma counselors should collaborate
with other professionals from the health and security agencies in the reintegration
processes of former Boko Haram terrorist members. For instance, all the supervisory
reintegration models should be post prosecution in nature. Depending on the
recommended period for full reintegration of the high-risk defectors, this unit or group of
professionals need not reinvent the wheel; they can be entrenched in the Nigerian
National Orientation Agency (NOA). One of the main aims of the NOA is to boost public
awareness reliably, positively change attitudes, values, and behaviors, accurately and
adequately inform, and sufficiently mobilize citizens to act in ways that would promote
public peace and harmony. The media industry should serve as actual watchdogs by
engaging in people-oriented and unbiased investigative journalism.
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Military. It is apparent from this case study that Nigeria’s military high-handed
reactionary approach toward the Boko Haram terrorist group is not yielding the expected
containment results. The loss of countless lives and properties is still ongoing. The
competence of the Nigerian military has never been in doubt, not with the many laudable
display of courage during international and local postings. But an urgent review of
military strategies (e.g., cross-national border collaboration, training, soft and hardware
resources) should be undertaken by policymakers to address the root causes of these acts
of terrorism. There is a fundamental disconnect where repentant Boko Haram terrorist
members are reintegrated into security agencies, including the military, with minimal
vetting processes. The laxity in the structural reintegration processes of Boko Haram
members into these security agencies has further exposed the vulnerabilities of these
agencies to outside attacks with the help of insider collaborators.
Religion. It is evident from the literature that religion plays a dominant role in the
indoctrination of potential recruits into the Boko Haram terrorist group. Religious leaders
need to be held accountable for their roles in radicalizing vulnerable youths through
religious indoctrination. There should be no sacred cow approach in handling any
religious leader found to be an avert supporter of religious extremism. Religious leaders
must be sincere in preaching tolerance, peaceful co-existence within communities, and
adherence to the superiority of state laws over religious doctrines. The government
should engage religious leaders in the deradicalization and communal reintegration
processes of former Boko Haram members.
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Resource Control. The mainstay of the Nigerian economy depends on the
petroleum industry for foreign earnings and sustainable growth. This wellspring of
natural resources comes from the Niger Delta region of the country and gets just 13%
federal government allocation from revenues as host communities. The Nigerian
government should review the current structure of the 13% resource control derivative
upward to reflect equity, justice, and fairness. The Nigerian government enacted the
Petroleum Industry Act (PIA) with its improved gas investment incentives. A 10-year
investment tax holiday to cover mainstream investment is a step in the right direction.
Hopefully, this tax holiday will provide a more robust framework to drive economic
growth within the Nigerian oil and gas industry.
Conclusion
This case study again reaffirmed the need for empirical research before
developing and implementing policy on a complex issue as terrorism and how to contain
the Boko Haram terrorist group in Nigeria. What started as a group of religious
fundamentalists within the span of 2 decades (2000–2020) has capitalized on government
failings and transformed into one of the most violent terrorist groups in the world. It is in
the interest of global security that world leaders as a collective assist the Nigerian state in
checkmating the terrorist activities before they become an uncontainable catastrophe.
The Nigerian government should revisit the Oputa panel recommendations
submitted in 2002. One of the reviews emphasized the need for regions to manage their
resources and contribute to the central pool, eliminating the federal monopoly and
focusing on decentralization. This repositioning will lead to healthy competition among
regions, cocoa industry in the west, tin, zinc, gold, groundnut pyramids in the north, and
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oil and gas in the south. The decentralization and management of these natural resources
might be the change sought by all ethnic groups to manage their scarce resources amid
the plenty within their locality.
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